

The Journal of
**LIBERAL
RELIGION**

• **WHEN**

PROTESTANTS
do not
PROTEST

By

HARMON M. GEHR

Ernest Fraenkel

This Issue—

Human Freedom and the Liberal Faith
AN EDITORIAL

**The Social Background of English
Unitarianism**

by F. H. AMPHLETT MICKLEWRIGHT

**Supernaturalism Looks for Philosophical
Support**

by ALFRED STIERNOTTE

German Orthodoxy is Bankrupt

by DIEDRICH MEYER-KLUEGEL

SIGNIFICANT BOOKS REVIEWED. Toynbee's *A Study of History*; Wieman's *The Source of Human Good*; Yinger's *Religion in the Struggle for Power*; Williams' *The Human Frontier*; Evans' *The Natural History of Nonsense*; Liebman's *Peace of Mind*; Barth's *Fiery Angel*—Florence Nightingale; Carr's *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* and others.

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Human Freedom and the Liberal Faith

AN EDITORIAL

The assault on human freedom in a rising crescendo of violence against personal dignity and against life itself is a sickening spectacle. Southern lynching mobs have again made the headlines in America's press, but they are only a blatant expression of a disease whose virus has infected men and women far and wide across the land. In Hollywood, California, a group of people recently instituted eviction proceedings against a certain family in their neighborhood. It was not a Negro family, and neither was it a Japanese family. It so happened that the wife and mother of this particular home was the daughter of a full-blooded Iroquois Indian. In the original deed for the tract of land on which that house was located was found an antiquated stipulation that only Caucasians be permitted to live there. The neighbors invoked the law, brought pressure to bear on the court, and won a decision to the effect that whereas the owner of the house, the father, being white, could remain, the mother, being half Indian, and the daughters, one-quarter Indian, had to seek a home elsewhere.

Human Freedom and the Bill of Rights

There are still people in Chicago who remember with anger and with shame the incident of only about a year ago, when the 65 year-old janitor of an apartment building—honored and respected by all the neighbors, and loved by the children—was falsely accused by the police of committing a fearful crime. Without waiting for the necessary evidence, and without any warrant for the man's arrest, the police held him prisoner. He later testified that they beat him, suspended him by his arms and otherwise tortured him until he fainted and until, forty-eight hours later, his innocence was completely established. Almost a score of Chicago policemen were involved in this unspeakable act of cruelty as a result

of which their victim was so seriously injured that he could no longer carry on his work; and so far as is known he has received no award of damages, nor even so much as the apologies of the city of Chicago.

The American Bill of Rights, written as nine amendments to the Constitution, to protect freedom of speech and of the press, has a loophole in the tenth amendment which delegates all the powers to the states not delegated to the Federal Government, and not forbidden to the states. It cannot defend American citizens against violence in states or municipalities where the local government itself refuses to intervene. In 1939 the Department of Justice established a Civil Rights Section to explore the possibilities of providing stronger defenses for the common man, but very little progress has thus far been made. There have been entered, during the past five years, 65,000 complaints against infringement on civil rights, of which only 667, or a few more than one per cent, were investigated. There were only 170 prosecutions and only 97 actual convictions, many of which were of a relatively mild nature. In our struggle to defend the rights of individuals it is to be remembered that no single person can do much, if anything. The protection of the law is a luxury which only the rich can afford, and it isn't usually the rich whose rights need to be defended. We are concerned with a social problem.

Human Freedom and Private Enterprise

The problem of human freedom, moreover, is desperately involved in our economic enterprise. There has been organized in this country a group of business men under the title, *New Council of American Business*. The NCAB is girding itself for a strictly defensive maneuver. It started during World War Two, when small business men discovered that the great corporations received by far the largest number of war contracts, and that the role of the lesser industrialists was to take such work as their giant competitors found it desirable to ration out to them. They are frightened men, these members of NCAB, and they include among their numbers many individual enterprisers who employ thousands of workers. They are not worried overmuch over the possibility of an industrial recession. What they dread above

everything else is the terrifying prospect that their status as private enterprisers is doomed. So fierce and ruthless is the struggle, so relentless and all-powerful the larger industries constantly encroaching on their fields of activity, that they know it is only a matter of time when they may have to choose between being pushed out entirely or being literally swallowed up by the Leviathan.

The great threat in America against free enterprise is not socialism or communism as such, it is free enterprise itself, grown too great for a democratic government like our own to cope with. Private enterprise, grown to its present dimensions, is destroying private enterprise, or, to put it another way, the great collectivists and totalitarians of our industrial and democratic West are not the socialists or the communists; they are, rather, the private enterprisers who will brook no competition and will sweep into their grasp every small business which stands in their way.

Human Values Lost in Bigness

All that has been said need not, of course, be construed as a rebuke of the private enterpriser. The problem is much too large and impersonal for either praise or blame. It is a social problem, for it concerns itself with human justice and human freedom, each in its larger dimensions. The problem is ever more complicated and ever more overwhelming.

Human values are lost in bigness. Bigness does not have to be cruel and indifferent to the individual needs of men and women; but in our kind of civilization it usually is. For those to whom the state is everything, the individual is somebody to be pushed around. He has many duties but relatively few privileges. For those for whom economic power and wealth are everything, the individual is a cog in a machine, a commodity, a tool, whose major value lies in serving another's purpose. Political bigness and economic bigness, in which the individual has not the power to cope with the forces arrayed against him—all that is characteristic of our contemporary world; and our economic bigness, with most of science and of technology in its control, is the most relentless and dangerous of them all. Moreover, inasmuch as it is in a more advanced stage in America than in

any other country, its dangers are accentuated here more than anywhere else.

In every walk of life does this pattern of bigness leave its mark on us. It agitates the labor situation almost beyond control by forcing the working class into the necessity of becoming itself a relentless power group. It sharpens the contrast between the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak; it corrupts our culture, fostering by its control of radio, motion picture and the press, a glorification of things at the expense of values and of ideals. Through this selfsame pattern of control it brings about a gradual strangulation of human thought and expression. Always we face the problem of defending and salvaging individuals who get lost or crushed in such a world; always the casualty lists of broken bodies and frustrated personalities grows longer and more despairing. What alternative is there to saying that our bigness of technological and economic achievement is, as of this moment in history, characterized in many areas of life by a cultural recession? Is there anything any of us can do, if nothing more than to save our own sense of significance in a historical situation so utterly overwhelming?

A Program of Personal Commitment

A minimum program might be said to involve three forms of personal commitment.

1. We must identify ourselves, cooperatively, with a relentless facing up to economic and political issues of our time. Alone we do not really count; alone we are powerless to resist at any single point the rising tide of reaction—and of violence. We need a fellowship of kindred minds, and it is in our churches where such fellowship should be generated, with a tireless curiosity about the nature of our world and of the temporal relationships of men and women. A really liberal church generates cosmic insights, social understanding, and common, human action. It is our first way-station where we can develop a philosophy, and a technique of exerting our common strength.

2. We can go further. We can unite with such other liberal movements and organizations where our common insights can be tested out, and where techniques of organizational

cooperation and interpenetration on a larger scale can be developed. The church, fighting shoulder to shoulder with these other—and “secular”—groups, needs the worldly wisdom which they can bring to our common enterprise.

3. We can encourage individuals—men and women in the ranks—to speak out in many personal ways and concerning many issues. Neither we nor they can join every crusade for human rights, but we can belong to all of them in spirit; and it is important just to be concerned, and just to clarify personal thinking, and just to speak out.

Here, then, is the leaven of the free and liberal spirit, fermenting and flowing over into every form of human articulation and of action. In his *A Study of History*, (see review page 229) Toynbee elaborates at length on the power and the significance of creative minorities. But whereas these minorities lose their effectiveness in mere *futurism* (Utopianism) they are just as important if they succumb to the dead hand of *archaism*. The attempt to restore the past, to revive a symbolism or a terminology which has lost its power to console or inspire, is the perennial temptation of decaying religious and political groups. Futility surrounds all their efforts—and tragedy, too. The archaist has no consolation for his world, no inspiration for its ideals, no cure for its ills.

If ever an age needed a minority sufficiently aflame with a passion to understand its contemporary world, sufficiently imaginative to identify its “secular” problems as essentially religious problems, and sufficiently courageous to offer leadership even where its leadership will be rebuffed and possibly rejected, it is our present age. Unless religion can accept its appointed role of being so utterly creative as to renounce every vestige of archaism—forever pushing forward to new modes of expression and of action—then ultimately it will lose even such influence and respect as it still enjoys. As religious liberals we must be a creative minority in the midst of an uncreative religious and political archaism, or there is no rôle left for us to play.

When Protestants Do Not Protest

By HARMON M. GEHR

Neither so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is the wall raised between church and state. . . . The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences by the state. (From Justice Rutledge's dissent in recent Supreme Court decision.)

Some of the early settlers of America were not willing to grant that God might consider any other religious persuasion than their own. It has been said that "the pious ones of Plymouth . . . first fell upon their knees and then upon the aborigines"¹, which may not be literally true; but it is known that they and the sterner settlers of the Bay Colony fell upon anyone who dared deviate openly from the accepted cultus. Puritan though he was, had John Milton emigrated to Massachusetts he would have had no scope for his genius.

Indeed, one Roger Williams was the victim of theocratic intolerance. Because he would not cease preaching against the identification of the church with the government he was driven from the Bay Colony under cruel circumstances. Only the friendship of Indians rescued him from death in a harsh New England winter. Nevertheless, in a spirit of complete goodwill toward his hostile neighbors, he founded the colony of Rhode Island. The late Kahlil Gibran said that he learned kindness from the unkind; and in a similar manner Roger Williams seemed to have learned the meaning of liberty from the intolerant, for he made colonial Rhode Island's government a model of religious and civil freedoms. "I affirm," he wrote, "that all the liberty of conscience I ever pleaded for turns upon these two hinges: that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to . . . prayers or worship; nor compelled from their own particular prayer or worship, if they practice any."² The colony of Rhode Island, begun in 1636, was the first civil state where religion and government were made

1. William Maxwell Evarts.

2. *Great Companions* Vol. I, Beacon Press. 1933. p. 571.

constitutionally separate. Thereby, religious and civil freedom received so vigorous an impetus that they were guaranteed in later colonial governments springing up in the new world. Maryland and Pennsylvania are outstanding, but in no case was the guarantee as complete as in Rhode Island. Maryland gave full civil rights only to believers in the Trinity; in Pennsylvania no Deist or Jew was permitted to hold public office.

Actually, though echoes of the free spirit that was behind the separation of church and state are apparent in the opening sentences of the Declaration of Independence, and separation is implicit in the first constitutional amendment, such a division did not become a fact until between 1825 and 1850. Then, coincident with the development of the public school system, direct state support was taken from parochial schools.³ Nevertheless, there still lingers in some state constitutions a qualification of religious freedom, although theoretically the constitution of every state in the American union upholds the separation of church and state. In the Tennessee constitution, for example, in addition to ringing statements affirming religious freedom for all citizens, there is this section: "No person who denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of the state."⁴

America, The Proving Ground

Practically, however, for more than a century the United States has been a proving-ground for the efficacy of the separation of church and state, and he is either an uninformed or a prejudiced citizen who will say that the cumulative result has not been worthy.

This is not intended to mean that the unparalleled freedom Americans enjoy is entirely derived from one particular provision. Separation is but part of a pattern of freedom which may be traced back through many individuals and institutions. Ernest Sutherland Bates has well said that the real roots of democracy

are to be found in the attempted revival of primitive Christianity by the radical lower-class sects of the Protestant Reformation.

3. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th edition, article on Education.

4. Article 9, Section 2.

mation, those peasants and yeomen who were our own ancestors, and who initiated the Reformation and eventually carried out its basic principles—especially in America—to conclusions undreamt of in the beginning. The ideal of local self-government was brought to America by the Pilgrims; the separation of Church and State was derived from the Baptists; the right of free speech was a development of the right to freedom of conscience established by Roger Williams and William Penn; the equality spoken of in the Declaration of Independence was an outgrowth of the equality practiced by the Quakers.⁵

The debt Americans owe to Protestantism can be met only by fulfilling that debt's requirements unceasingly.

Unity Among Larger Protestant Groups

True, there are critics who look at the luxuriance of American denominationalism, one result of the freedom granted by the founders, and groan at sight of this religious anarchy. Yet lack of uniformity may not mean lack of unity. There has been growing co-operation on a voluntary basis among the more massive divisions of American Protestantism; and who will not say that this is preferable to the straitjacket of religious authoritarianism? The numerous small sects do not include sufficient numbers or bear enough weight intellectually to threaten Protestant unity. Most important, because of the freedom which has permitted these many churches to live, and has kept them apart from the control of government, Americans have not known the terrible interneccine persecution—in the name of God—that other nations, identifying sectarianism with government, have experienced. Nor has that devastating corruption of ecclesiastical power, turned inward and grown rotten, been known in this country.

Of those who worry unduly about America's sectarianism the question might be asked, "Would your particular sect have ever had a chance if the first settlers had been able to keep their religion dominant in the government of America?"

In a time of religious and political reaction in Holland, Baruch de Spinoza wrote passionate words that should be

5. Quoted in *The Legacy of the Liberal Spirit* by Fred G. Bratton, Scribners, 1943, p. 81.

burned into the minds of all free men of any era who are tempted to obliterate significant convictions in the name of unity, or to consider insidious and continual attacks upon the grounds of their freedom as being irrelevant in an enlightened age. Said Spinoza:

Doomed indeed is any land where opinions are put on trial and condemned as crimes, and where those who avow them are sacrificed, not to public safety, but to the hatred and savagery of their enemies. . . . Deeds alone should be made grounds of criminal charges, and speech should be utterly free. . . . Every man should be allowed to think what he likes and say what he thinks . . . (for) without such freedom there cannot be any peace or true piety. . . . Piety and religion—great God! They are become but a tissue of ridiculous mysteries. And men who frankly despise reason, who reject and scorn understanding as naturally evil, these . . . of all men are thought—O lie most horrible!—to possess light from on high! Verily, if they had but one spark of that light from on High, they would not so insolently rave, but would learn to worship God wisely, and would be as marked among their fellows for mercy as they are now for malice!⁶

A mistake of any generation which enjoys liberty is to believe the battle is fought only once and can then be forgotten. The fact is that the battle can never cease without endangering the cause for which it was begun. Bills of Rights do not safeguard those rights, they merely prohibit violations. And lawyers and lobbies can easily get around prohibitions. In theory the church and the state are separate in this country, but increasingly in practice it is shown that they are not apart. And Protestants, of all people, who are responsible historically for the division of church and state and what it implies, not only stand by blandly while separation is being abridged, but themselves endeavor to profit by likewise identifying church and state. But then, Protestantism may no longer include those who protest.

Protestant Majorities Indifferent to Issue

The prolonged conflict over control of the nation's schools in the first half of the nineteenth century originally brought the distinction between church and state to a focus. "Excepting the battle for the abolition of slavery perhaps no

6. Spinoza, Baruch de *Treatise on Theology and Politics*, from the preface.

question has ever been before the American people for settlement which has caused so much feeling or aroused such antagonisms.⁷ It is not an accident that a major internal threat to American liberty in our time is also concerned with the control of public education.

In the past several years seventeen states have passed legislation enabling public funds to be used for parochial schools. In all but one of these states Protestants are in a majority, and in these same states there are large numbers of the unchurched who cherish privileges of religious liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution. "But this great body of the electorate has allowed a church representing only one-sixth of the population . . . to make a second breach in the wall of separation between church and state. They have allowed it to happen because they were inattentive to the thing that was happening before their eyes."⁸ And with a bill pending in Congress which would give Catholic schools large federal grants on the same basis as public schools, and with Supreme Court decisions upholding the payment of everybody's money for parochial school textbooks and for the transportation of a sect's children to that sect's schools, there can be no question that public control of the schools of America is again threatened. Mere priests now do not fear stating openly that the Catholic hierarchy is opposed to the separation of church and state. Why should they fear saying what is generally known?

Are Protestants concerned? Or is the average Protestant like a member of the church I serve. This good man told me he had always assumed that if Catholics were willing to take the burden of teaching from the public schools they deserved some help from the state! An excellent Catholic argument, but not to be expected from a Protestant.

Justice Rutledge Speaks Out

Perhaps a non-judicial feeling such as that is behind the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of *Everson vs. the Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, N.J.* May be it was what caused Justice Murphy, the only Catholic on

7. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th edition, article on Education.

8. Editorial in *The Christian Century*, Feb. 26, 1947, p. 263.

the bench, to cast the deciding vote which favored his church. Justice Rutledge's dissent however, did spring from understanding of a lesson that a century of American freedom has taught. Said he,

Neither so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is the wall raised between church and state . . . by the First Amendment . . . (This) is . . . the second breach to be made by this Court's action. That a third, and a fourth, and still others will be attempted, we may be sure. . . . The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences by the state. . . . Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings, too, the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any. . . . The end of such strife cannot be other than to destroy the cherished liberty.

Two great drives are constantly in motion to abridge, in the name of education, the complete division which our fore-fathers made. One is to introduce religious education and observances into the public schools. The other, to obtain public funds for the aid and support of various private religious schools.⁹

Many Protestants have been applauding the Judge's attack on the latter of those 'two great drives': "to obtain public funds for the aid and support of various private religious schools." Perhaps it is simply a feeling of anti-Catholicism that makes them do so, for generally these same people have taken no notice of the equally strong condemnation of the drive "to introduce religious education and observances into the public schools." Possibly these Protestants feel that this is within their rights because it has been going on for twenty-three years, or because 2,000,000 school children are now subject to this religious intrusion, and 47 of the 48 states permit it. But one wonders wherein the difference lies between Catholics and Protestants. Is it to be concluded that self-interest is the only criterion?

The issue of released time for religious education is at present very much alive within the Philadelphia Council of Churches. Of the sixty directors on its board only one voted against introducing this program into the Philadelphia pub-

lic schools. Of the many denominations in this city only four small ones have rallied to support the principle of separation, but they are mightily backed by a united Jewish community and encouraged by the support of many school teachers. One wonders though if the word Protestant still carries anything of its historical connotation.

“Released time,” according to its proponents, “is time taken from any period of the public school day for the religious education of all children whose parents request it.”¹⁰ Erwin L. Shaver of the International Council of Religious Education, which organization is the mainspring of the program, states categorically that there is no infringement of separation involved.¹¹ Other Protestant leaders likewise believe that there is no violation. Perhaps the Supreme Court will some time uphold this interpretation—with Justice Murphy dissenting.

Summarizing the Argument

There are many however, who believe that even the Supreme Court can be fallible. Among their reasons for continuing their opinion that released time does constitute a violation of the letter and spirit of separation are the following:

1. It involves the payment of public money for sectarian uses. For registration of pupils by public teachers; the keeping of records; payment of teachers who are forced to “mark time” while pupils are in classes of religion; enforcement of attendance by truant officers publicly employed; upkeep of buildings and equipment not being used for purpose intended; in many cases the use of public school buildings for sectarian purposes.
2. It infringes upon the guaranteed liberty of Americans (children included) to worship as they please, or not to worship. It introduces friction and pressure into the melting-pot.
3. It interferes with administrative organization of public schools. More than once the program in a particular place has been discontinued for this reason.
4. It sets up what may become a precedent of importance

10. from *Remember the Weekday*, pamphlet pub. by I.C.R.E.

11. *ibid.*

later. For example, NYA funds were used to aid students in parochial schools ten years ago. In 1938 it was denied by the NYA. Now those who received such money at that time are advancing it as a precedent for donations of government to religion.¹² Are Protestants less capable than Catholics of getting on the bandwagon when free funds are available?

5. Any introduction of formal religious training into the time allotted for public education, in any manner whatsoever, is, in the terms of Justic Rutledge's dissent, a threat to the continued separation of church and state.

Dr. Conrad Moehlman of Rochester-Colgate Theological School has seen the issue clearly, and has explored it at length in at least two books. Recently he wrote:

By released time is meant the use of public school time for sectarian teaching. The method is an infringement upon the rights of all in behalf of the alleged privilege of the few. If pursued to its logical conclusion, it would destroy freedom of religion among us. It would turn public schools into sectarian institutions.¹³

At its twenty-fifth anniversary conference, November 24, 1945, the American Civil Liberties Union adopted the following resolution:

That it is the function of the schools to bring about an understanding of the various aspects of American culture including religion, but that there should be no inculcation of any particular faith or derogation of any faith.

That the American Civil Liberties Union should continue to support the principle that the separation of church and state should be maintained in the schools.

That in support of the principle the American Civil Liberties Union should oppose: 1) the teaching of religion in the schools. 2) The use of public funds for non-public schools. 3) The establishment of the released time system where it does not already exist.

That where the released time system is already in operation, the American Civil Liberties Union should continue to work for its abolition. . . .

George A. Coe, dean of American religious educators, has consistently opposed the released time program. John Dewey has appeared before the New York City Board of Education

12. *Liberty, a Magazine of Religious Freedom*, First Quarter, 1947, p. 30.

13. *Liberty*, Fourth Quarter, 1946, p. 9.

to read a statement against the adoption of released time. Many other eminent educators and a few churchmen could be named as opposing the plan.

Protestants are confronted here with an issue that they are not facing as it should be faced. It is an issue that concerns their fundamental political and religious faith. To be true to that faith they must be scrupulous to uphold with all their power one of its major tenets—the separation of church and state.

Social Background of English Unitarianism

By F. H. AMPHLETT MICKLEWRIGHT

At the invitation of the editor our distinguished British contributor traces the development of Unitarian religious thinking through the intricate maze of Britain's economic and political development from Toryism to Socialism and the present Labor Government.

It would be possible and not out of proportion for the historian of the social scene in the England of today to write the contemporary history in terms of the breakdown of individualism. The battles of the seventeenth century ended in the victory of the mercantile classes and the supplanting of the older agricultural feudalism. With the Reform Bill of 1832, the power of landed aristocracy had reached its end. The movement of the Industrial Revolution had intensified the process by removing economic emphasis from land and agriculture to industry and commerce. As a result, the industrial magnate came to occupy the place once held in the social scale by the landed proprietor. Politics changed color and took on a new meaning. After 1832 the great era of liberalism dawned with its emphasis upon the place of competition within commercial life. A stress upon the individual made for a consideration of individual liberties. As yet, the battle was not economic so much as political, and it was essentially a middle-class movement shaped by the attempt of the middle-classes to seize control. For a few years, from 1815 until 1832, middle and working classes had joined in an outcry for parliamentary reform and for the supplanting of the feudal magnates in government.

Here, then, was a threat of complete social revolution. But the reforms of Parliament in 1832 were essentially of a middle-class type and, between 1832 and 1867, a gradual transition took place in England from aristocracy to middle-class political democracy. As a result middle and working class interests were parted, and the social gains were largely those possessing meaning to the substantial wage-earner. At the same time there was a strong movement in the direction

of political liberty and free speech. Joseph Chamberlain, as Mayor of Birmingham in the eighteen-seventies, could make republican speeches which would have landed him in jail fifty years earlier. By a like process, the defence of established religion at law had been largely a political matter. Nonconformity now came into its own, ranging over from Evangelical dissent to the more definite forms of agnosticism and atheism. John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Liberty* was a textbook of the period with its crying down of the idea of the transcendent state and its support for individual liberty in all matters of thought and opinion.

Various forces have gone to the break-up of this era. Two world wars are symptoms of underlying upheaval rather than causes of collapse but each marks a stage in the breakdown of the age of liberality. Movements to price-rings, cartels and semi-monopoly in industry tended to create a culture and civilization which was anti-individualist and which split mankind into the small controlling group, living upon invested capital, and the far larger group of wage-earners and consumers standing at their mercy. Social struggles tended to be colored by the rapidly mounting level of unemployment created by the interplay of capitalist economics and to move in the direction of demands for workers' control and industrial democracy. Sidney Webb and his talented wife were among the most important leaders in this movement through the extent to which they provided it with a Fabian philosophy of reform. Gradually, such issues as that of the municipal ownership of essential services have spread outwards into a demand for state ownership of economic monopoly as an essential step towards industrial democracy. In the post-war period a sharp battle is being fought between the forces of a Fabian reformist socialism and a revised capitalism. Neither side proposes a reversion to the liberalized individualism of the later nineteenth century simply because the social situation has changed, and it would be an impossible reconstruction within a twentieth century framework. On the one hand, however, there is a steady demand for a conception of the cult of power controlled by a democracy which has spread beyond politics and has come to embrace the applied economics of the nation

whilst, on the other hand, there is a demand for the retention of private ownership and profit which is sometimes outlined in terms of a small-scale capitalistic distributism but which could easily mean a living parallel to the corporate state of Mussolini. It is significant that neither Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden on the one side, nor Mr. Attlee and Sir Stafford Cripps on the other, propose any approach to the revival of individualism.

The Puritan Roots of English Unitarianism

English Unitarianism is the product of this wider social evolution. Its roots lay in the English Reformation and in the immensely strong wing of Puritanism which embraced the mercantile and trading classes. The older Unitarian chapels are mainly the lineal descendants, sometimes the original buildings, of the English Presbyterians who represented the right-wing propertied element within the Puritan movement. Aristocratic Puritanism was a thing thrown up by the seventeenth century struggle for the rights of Parliament, and it had died away by the middle years of the succeeding century, leaving as its successor the wealthier trading classes who found themselves excluded from aristocratic landed government. At the same time, they were a cultured class, and the freedom from theological tests which represented the developing Presbyterianism gave to them an atmosphere in which reason could do its work.

The period was one of the rising middle-class development, and the movement within the chapels from Calvinism to Arianism and finally to Unitarianism was one which marked the steady growth of a middle-class intellectual and social culture. So far as the artisan classes were concerned, they were not much affected by this development. Gathered by the Industrial Revolution into the new industrialized towns, their theological future lay with the revivalist campaigns of Methodism. The developing intellectual tendencies which R. H. Gretton sketches out in his *History of the English Middle Class* are illustrated in a particular manner by the development of a rationalistic Unitarianism. They were among the forces which, in 1832, made middle-class England into a political and social possibility.

This particular strand within Unitarian social develop-

ment was one which, as Professor Laski remarked when reviewing R. V. Holt's work on the *Social Contribution of Unitarianism*, in the *New Statesman and Nation*, made for the evolution of middle-class democracy. It meant that the typical Unitarian was a political liberal and democrat, heavily influenced by the effects of the French Revolution upon English history and, until 1832, joined up with the working-classes in a common demand for change and reform. Some Unitarians were in full agreement with Priestley in his defence of the French revolution whilst others, such as William Frend, were firm supporters of Sir Francis Burdett in the challenge which he gave to the autocracy of George III. A few had supported John Wilkes in his battle-cries for political liberty a generation earlier. But it must not be overlooked that they were also men of substance and means whose real and bitter grievance was that they were excluded as tradesmen and merchants from a predominantly agricultural government. Thus, they were thrown into a common cause with the more definite working-class leaders. When, in 1832, the vote was given to the ten-pound householder, and the middle-class age was at hand, the alliance was broken and some of the more prominent Unitarians had passed over into a cautious liberalism — such as that of Mrs. Gaskell, the novelist—which made for reform, and which sympathized with the economically oppressed but which did not offer any root-and-branch challenge to the prevailing social and economic framework.

A further social complication was brought about by the Romantic Revival. The extent to which it emphasized the absolute and to which it was guided by an Hegelianism of the right created within it a very definitely static approach to social and political problems. Romanticism, standing in contrast to the revolutionary implications of eighteenth century rationalism, led Coleridge, Southey and Wordsworth away from their erstwhile political radicalism, and their Socinian phase in religious thought, and brought them back into conformity with a high estimate of the state as the absolute within political constitutions and to an acceptance of the Established Church as affording a link between the absolute state and ecclesiastical organization. It did not cause

Dr. Martineau to desert a Unitarian theology. He did, however, desire the Church of England to be so enlarged that it could contain this theological definition in order that Unitarians might enjoy the benefits of standing within the ecclesiastical establishment. Moreover, it did lead him to a strong support for Toryism in politics and for the Confederacy during the American Civil War. He remained a firm and consistent admirer of Disraeli, and in opposition to radicals of the type of Professor Goldwin Smith. This modification of political thinking among the wealthier Unitarians affected some of them after 1832 and, although the majority following Gladstone remained Liberal in politics, must be taken into consideration as a moderating and conservative force.

Religion and Liberal Political Radicalism

The more progressive elements of English political and economic thought now tended to go forward into a liberal radicalism, strongly individualist, but likewise strongly democratic. Various working-class forces assembled around this banner. The young co-operative and trades union movements were the result of combination in terms of radical social thinking. Many were republicans who desired to see the throne swept away along with the power of the Established Church. The radicals drew their strength from the new industrial families, such as the Chamberlains, as well as from the general background of the artisan classes. At the same time Unitarianism had tended to spread—and fresh congregations had come into being. Its free approach to religious problems was apt to fit well into the culture of an age which stressed individual reason and freedom of conscience as possessing rights within a general atmosphere of toleration. Many of the new Unitarian chapels were in the industrial towns and drew their support from the smaller factory owner and his workpeople. As a result, they became centres of a liberal political radicalism.

During the struggles from 1880 until 1884 over Charles Bradlaugh, the atheist leader—and his right to take his seat in the House of Commons as member for Northampton without affirming belief in a theological deity—Unitarians were

commonly divided. The old middle-class Unitarians, whose own social battle had been won in 1832, were shocked, and would have nothing to do with him. But in many chapels supported by a working-class congregation, minister and people saw the cause of Bradlaugh as being essentially their own, and laboured for his political victory whilst denouncing his philosophical anti-theism. A second strand had arisen within English Unitarian development, that of the working-class radical reformer.

These two strands have gradually grown together in many ways. Some of the small factory-owners found themselves to have evolved into the position of masters of monopoly and, like the Chamberlains, dropped their old radicalism. It is an interesting observation that, as the Chamberlain family grew away from radicalism they also grew away from Unitarianism. Political events in 1886 and again in 1921 clearly pointed to the evolution of Socialism and the Labour Party and meant that, politically, the anti-Socialist and individualist found himself naturally within a new version of Toryism. Some of the wealthier Unitarians were guided by this development but, for the most part, Unitarians belonged still to one of the variant shades of liberal reformism, gradually finding themselves outside the main stream of what has now led to the Labor Government. Their individualistic outlook made against the corporate thinking of the Socialists, and but few prominent ministers were to be found in the early Socialist ranks. E. M. Geldart was a co-worker of the Marxist, H. M. Hyndman, but the fact so estranged his congregation that one of the ablest Unitarian thinkers of his day was driven into resignation of his pastorate and to suicide. P. H. Wicksteed was more or less forced out of the active ministry through his advanced social views. Stopford Brooke remained, but he was minister of an independent congregation who, on the whole, found the thinking of their distinguished pastor acceptable. The Toryism of Dr. Martineau or the capitalistic liberalism of J. J. Tayler or R. A. Armstrong was far more typical of Unitarianism — on its wealthier plane—at the close of the last century. Allied with the forces of reform, the liberal Unitarians did much valuable work for education and social services; it would be a

grave mistake to rank them as merely upon the side of the possessing classes. Yet they were certainly not to be found commonly, among those who advocated any far-reaching change in the social system.

Unitarianism Over-identified With Individualism

At the present time, English Unitarianism is in something of a difficulty. It is over-identified with a liberalism which makes for individualism and away from a social or corporate approach to the problems of contemporary man. There are good historical reasons for this fact as has been indicated, but the fact is nevertheless apt to become disturbing in the light of recent economic and political developments. As a result, Unitarians tend to find themselves directed by the economic and social changes of the time rather than themselves taking the direct lead. Among prominent laymen, Lord Woolton still fights the battles of capitalism and commercialism from a place of high rank within the Tory party. On the other hand, the Rt. Hon. Chuter Ede, M.P., is as emphatically Socialistic and is the Unitarian Home Secretary within a Labour government administration. Unitarian laity can be found upon both sides in the far-reaching divisions challenging contemporary society. Among the ministers, many of the older men still stand by liberal battle-cries which they learned in the closing years of the last century or in the process of winning Liberal victories at the polls as long ago as 1906. But many of the younger men have come to realize that a new and corporate way of looking at social problems does not permit of an unguarded liberal individualism. Tolerance and freedom call for definition in social terms: Is liberty of expression, for example, to be allowed to the semi-Fascist who wishes to subvert a democratic society in the interests of intolerance or to the racialist who would use the tolerance granted him as a means of oppressing the Jew? Social issues within the contemporary world have come to illustrate more fully the point of view that control may be the road to a greater freedom. The older individualism in economics was killed by the monopolist, and the amount of individuality possible to the life of the ordinary citizen was conditioned by the

fact. Control of monopoly or its state-ownership may well make for a greater freedom of the individual in the last resort. In the same way, a fresh definition of the state is necessary. It is no longer possible to write it off with Mill as being merely the sum total of the individuals which it includes. As the legal organ of government, it is coming to play an increasing part within a democratic social order considered from its corporate aspects. The democratic state must make inroads upon the lives of individuals in the name of freedom.

Considerations of this type have carried some ministers over into the ranks of the Labour Party and to an advocacy of Socialism. For the most part it is a Socialism heavily marked by English and Fabian reformist traits, tending to pacifism as a direct outcome of typical Unitarian teaching upon the subject of human brotherhood. Possibly few Unitarians have accepted the dogmatic method sufficiently to be found as thorough-going Marxists within the ranks of the Communist party, though most of those who have accepted Socialism to any degree would probably accept the semi-Marxist analysis of economic history which is congenial to Harold Laski, G. D. H. Cole and other radical English scholars in these fields. On the whole, an inherited belief in tolerance of opposing views, and in progress as a guide to the art of living, has prevented Unitarian congregations from becoming rent asunder by purely social or political disputes, as has happened in some other denominations. Advanced nonconformity in England has been traditionally progressive, politically, as an offset to the Toryism of the Established Church. Yet, the social cleavage which may be traced back to 1832 is still present within the Unitarian body, and must not be underrated.

In the same way this cleavage is strongly marked in contemporary theology. A traditional Unitarian adopts an old-fashioned theism which stresses God as "other" and as Governor of the universe. It tends to be an aristocratic theism, and certainly makes against democratic ways of thinking, a fact observed by Curtis W. Reese and John H. Dietrich as long ago as 1915. Definitions of religion have been shaped in the past by economic and social develop-

ments. Oriental sultans gave their quota to the evolution of the idea of God as did the Roman Empire. Mediæval feudalism left its mark upon theological evolution, and the evolutionary course was continued in the capitalistic God of Calvinism and the competitive go-ahead God of liberal industrialism. As R. H. Tawney has shown in his masterly *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, the theological ideas of a religion are largely wrought out within the mould of the social and economic background within which it finds itself, a fact which Leonard Woolf underlined in *After the Deluge* through the application of psychological considerations to a given historical period. The liberal industrial God is out of favour because liberal industrialism is passing into a new phase of social development. As a result, there is a tendency to assert once more the high god of Calvinism, the divine dictator. It is an expected development in an age when the passing over of thought into an acceptance of dictatorship is the logical political development of economic capitalism and is likewise the sole logical answer in corporate terms to a developing Socialist democracy. Both Barthians, pure and simple, and the followers of Reinhold Niebuhr are social pessimists who give over the contemporary world to the devil. Only supernatural grace, supernaturally given, can save man in society as well as man, the individual. This theology is clearly a particular version of the frustration which has overtaken liberal capitalist democracy. On the secular plane the answer is that of the dictator and the corporate state. In theological terms, the frustration becomes defined in the guise of original sin; and the dictator-God is the natural parallel to the earthly dictator of secular orders.

The God-Concept in Terms of Life-Force

It is clear that a theology which accepts social optimism and which sees in man the power to achieve an earthly destiny of happiness and co-operation must pay an increasing regard to the definitions of its religious thinking. When it seeks to define itself through the acceptance of metaphorical definitions of God as all-Father, as King or Lord, it is clearly falling back into an illogical compromise with the dictatorial

approach. At the same time, it is reminded by science that the universe is a unity and that the conception of God must be defined from within this universal order as life-force, the final summing-up of universal causation. This approach is congenial to such corporate approaches to life which nevertheless seek to define themselves in terms of democracy. The spirit of God is the spirit of life, and every manifestation of life is a partial and possibly deformed manifestation of the God who is the life of the universe. At the same time a religion which sets aside the sin-obsession defined into terms of absolute human worthlessness, as does the whole Unitarian tradition, is concerned with the worthwhile character of human achievement. Its scope is unlimited for it is a religion concerned with every manifestation of life. The whole universal order is the scene of its revelation whilst all exalted and noble thoughts form its sacred books. It is therefore a humanist religion, finding its scope in the natural universe, admitting the vast limitations upon its knowledge as it faces the problem of "man the unknown," yet seeing in the rational mind of man the highest aspects of the creativeness of the life-force. Insofar as no finite mind can comprehend the depths of infinitude, knowledge of ultimate life, the life-force which may be identified with the spirit of God, is gained through these limited aspects of the life-force in operation. When man in history comes to be considered the figure of Jesus stands forth as one of the great religious geniuses of the world story. But so, too, do others of differing religious traditions. It is not possible to define an evolving and emerging religion in terms of a stereotyped version of the teaching of any one ancient teacher, a reminder that religion at its best is internationalist and not isolationist.

From Christo-centrism to Humanistic Naturalism

Enough has been said to suggest that a theology which finds itself in harmony with the developing social situation, and which is also a development of the Unitarian tradition, must be an essay in a scientific and religious humanism, vitally concerned with human values and with their presentation within contemporary life in order that the individuality of the individual may be safeguarded. Just as it was necessary for Unitarianism to develop from Channing and a strictly

biblical Christo-centric phase into the thought of Parker and Martineau, so it is now necessary for a Unitarian approach which is abreast of the times to consider in the same spirit of tolerance the naturalism of John Dewey. The challenge which stands before English Unitarianism in the post-war years is that of the extent to which it is ready and willing to face this far-reaching undertaking. In some ways, the humanist controversy which convulsed American Unitarianism some years ago left only a few rumbling re-echoes in this country. The time was not yet ripe although a work of the type of Kirsopp Lake's *Religion of Yesterday and To-morrow* was already shaking the roots of "devout modernism" and various other liberalized compromises. Since those days, the social issues of the time have become more obvious, and it has become clearer to the observer that they are deeply entwined with the future developments of free religion. Professor Harry Elmer Barnes' valuable work, the *Twilight of Christianity*, had no English edition, but the characteristic stresses of this book have entered into advanced Unitarian thinking. The religious liberalism of the future must be concerned with man and with human achievement; its definitions of God must be in terms of the experience of living man. Erich Kahler's great work, *Man the Measure*, is a defence of this attitude in terms of a synoptic view of human history which is becoming increasingly symptomatic of the creative trends within contemporary culture. A struggle is taking place for control of the cult of power, and division into social optimists or social pessimists is largely caused by the economic and political issues at stake in the battle.

English Unitarianism has a tremendous opportunity today. The traditional denominations are far too closely allied to an outmoded view of the universe and to a reactionary position in social organization to have much effect upon the emerging civilization. Their rapid loss of social prestige in contemporary England is a witness to the fate that is obviously overtaking them. Yet, as was to be seen in such a work as Julius Branthal's *In Search of the Millennium*, younger social thinkers are engaged in a demand for the discovery of moral values and in an attempt to apply these universal evaluations to their social experiments, a trait not to be found in the

more orthodox Marxism which engulfed the nineteen-thirties. In short, they are taking the same road which a Unitarian humanism should likewise be taking, and are seeking to discover the universal directives which it should be the place of a Unitarian humanism to supply. Old-fashioned forms of theism are dead simply because the social background which gave rise to them has disintegrated. The impulses and experiences of man which led to these formerly accepted definitions have now to take new forms and to find new modes of expression. Unitarianism, with its traditions and its flexibility existing side by side, offers the exact method by which social thinking can find a fresh moral basis in the light of a re-definition of God in terms of man. The question now before English Unitarianism, at a time of rapid social change, is whether or not it will prove to have sufficient vision to undertake a humanist pilgrimage bringing it into a living relationship with the emerging culture of a new age.

When Supernaturalism Looks for Philosophical Support

By ALFRED STIERNOTTE

A reviewer takes issue with Erich Frank's suggestion that the alternative to traditional theism is biological materialism, and charges that his attempt to reconcile the conflict between the philosophy and theology results merely in the acceptance of a new supernaturalism.*

This little volume comprises the Mary E. Flexner Lectures delivered at Bryn Mawr in 1943, and illustrates the type of theology that has become fairly prominent in America as a result of the influence of European scholars on our thinking. Typical of German academic production, it proceeds through such time-honored topics as *The Nature of Man*, *The Existence of God*, *Creation and Time*, etc., in most learned language, with exceedingly few concrete examples to reinforce the argument. Not only that, but the 101 pages of text are supplemented by no less than 78 pages of notes in fine print, and 27 pages of index! It is difficult to say whether the footnotes have been added *ad nauseam* to bring forth the author's erudition on every conceivable reference having to do with theology or philosophy, or whether the text is a noble attempt to connect the footnotes in some sort of loose and running commentary!

The ambitious project of reconciling the conflict between philosophy and theology turns out to be merely the acceptance of the new supernaturalism and of whatever type of philosophy may be found to be in agreement with it—if such be found. Such philosophy as is not in agreement with the declarations of the historical faith, if not ignored, is merely relegated to a species of reductive materialism. We are told of man, for example, that "no longer does an absolute barrier separate him from mere animal life, and that even his highest intellectual achievements appear simply as the effects of certain biological factors." Biological processes are no doubt involved in intellectual eminence, but I do not know of a single scientist who would hold that intellect is merely

*PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH. By Erich Frank. New York: Oxford University Press. 209 pp. \$2.50.

a matter of the biochemistry of the brain. Apparently our author has never heard of emergent evolution or evolutionary naturalism in which new factors and new dimensions of being are added by virtue of the organization of material. Roy Wood Sellars has rightly made much of this point in his philosophy, and could teach our author a good deal about the philosophy of emergence.

Theism vs. Biological Materialism: Not the Issue

Furthermore, the footnote which bears on the quotation just given is a statement accredited to J. B. Bury: "A historian may be a theist, but so far as his work is concerned this particular belief is otiose." Now, this note is supposed to illustrate the alleged conclusion of science given in the text that "intellectual achievements appear simply as the effects of certain biological factors." Where the connection between the historian's loss of belief in God and biological factors lies, I do not pretend to know. Or is the author implying that the moment a scholar gives up theism, he must be reduced to a mass of biological materialism? It appears that our ambitious dialectician sincerely believes it is a case of mechanical materialism or traditional supernatural theology. Some occult friends of mine once earnestly contended that the choice was between the fantastic revelations of Madame Blavatsky and mechanical materialism. Man had an "astral body" and could climb "astral planes," or else he was just a "bag of bones!" Neither they nor Erich Frank ever imagined that there are philosophic positions between these two extremes by means of which more plausible reconciliations of philosophy and religion may be investigated.

The central thesis of the book may be given in this quotation: "But for us, for whom God is not of this world, it is not through reason but through faith that we can have access to the Absolute." The "God not of this world" theory is further brought into prominence in the author's chapter on *The Existence of God*. He affirms that the modern attempts to work out a naturalistic conception of God were negated by Kierkegaard who

brought back to the mind of present-day philosophers the fact that in view of the negative forces of the world and in man, a God of *this* world cannot be God for us, and

that what we do call God, we can find only in our faith, not in any theoretical philosophical system.

Does not this admission imply that the author's ambitious attempt to reconcile the transcendent God of faith with philosophy amounts to futility? for any system of inquiry must necessarily come to grips with categories of this world. By definition a transcendental category, such as orthodox theism, is beyond the apprehension of human reason or any other human capacity.

The author is aware that such transcendental ideology is unacceptable to modern man, but he has rebelled against it. "Whenever modern man speaks of progress in history, he actually means this advance towards enlightenment and rationalization which finally led to a determined revolt against God." A most deplorable state of affairs! Again,

This development has come about through an inner necessity which the individual seems unable to evade. If in any historical fact, it is here that we cannot help recognizing a manifestation of divine Providence.

With this sleight-of-hand logic, one can prove that any rebellion against traditional religion is still the work of God! The traditionalist has a new subterfuge in his argumentation. He has it both ways! Believe his doctrine and all is well; deny it and this very denial is apparently still inspired by God; nevertheless, you will have the devil to pay for such denial!

Reason is a particular aversion of our author. Here is a splendid example of it:

Modern reason having turned against itself and against its most sublime idea, that of humanity, in this way has led to historical scepticism and relativism and thus to inhumanity.

What an unsupported assertion concerning the supposedly evil doings of human reason! But worse is yet to come!

Caesar is the most conspicuous example of what human reason may accomplish in this world. He is the great political genius who through superiority of his intellect always recognized the right means for his ends.

But this eulogy given to human reason is merely a trap in which to capture the unwary for we are told:

To the world which was craving for freedom and peace, he could give nothing but the despotism of an empire

which was a mockery of true freedom and offered only the peace of a graveyard.

Quite true, but, in the words of Lester P. Mondale, it is "the logic of lies" to ascribe this despotism to the work of reason! Has the author ever heard of Marcus Aurelius? On this misleading illustration of Caesar as the embodiment of the highest achievement of reason, there are no less than eleven footnotes occupying more than three full pages. All of which again shows what an artificial brand of scholarship is this which multiplies footnotes helter-skelter in an attempt to justify the mendacious assertion; namely, that the highest work of human reason inevitably leads to despotism! How much nobler is Dean Inge's statement to the effect that human reason is man's most divine attribute. Besides this illuminating thought of the "gloomy Dean" the accents of our author are steeped in Stygian blackness.

Enough has been given to demonstrate the bias of the author and perhaps the bias of the reviewer as well! To the people asking for bread an abstract theological stone is given! This type of reactionary thinking will never bring succor to a single displaced person, will never feed a child suffering from malnutrition in Europe, will never bring freedom to those under the lash of tyranny. It has nothing to say about present attempts to realize the good life in this world. On the contrary, "the struggle to actualize the humanitarian ideal led to tragic consequences." (p. 139). Those who wish a more cogent and skilful presentation of this point of view had better turn to Reinhold Niebuhr and leave aside this obscure and negative book—though we are not suggesting that Niebuhr is *the* prophet.

Man's Cosmic Vision of Emergent Values

Other attempts to interpret religion in terms of philosophy are now being made, and when the mists and obscurities of argumentation are dissolved it may well be that a reconstruction on naturalistic and humanistic terms will be much more fruitful than this obstinate, backward-looking theology. No, it is manifestly not a choice between rationalistic mechanical materialism and "the faith once and for all delivered to the saints." There is the emergent picture of the universe hav-

ing the potentiality of giving rise to man's highest achievements, and of the religious man achieving his fulfilment by being sustained by this cosmic vision of emergent values, lifting every human horizon and filling the humblest creature with hope, dignity and heroism. The philosophical formulation of this outlook can dispense with supernatural theism and the trappings of idealistic philosophy, according to which this world is merely a pale shadow for a reality of Platonic essences in some supra-mundane, immaterial, mental, spiritual category beyond "mere" existence. It is precisely because religious naturalism finds its vision satisfied in this natural setting and regards as superfluous supernaturalism in theology, and idealism in philosophy, that such men as Erich Frank and W. E. Hocking rage at the temerity of this thought. But it remains true that "new occasions teach new duties." The contrast between neo-orthodoxy and naturalism may be simply given: in neo-orthodoxy the metaphysical nature of existence is such that man cannot achieve any lasting good in history, but must project his values symbolically into such realms as "supra-history" and "supra-nature." In naturalism, whether it be theistic or humanistic, the metaphysical nature of existence is such that man can profit from his experiences of failure and tragedy to build an earthly mansion nearer to his heart's desire, and that such terminology as "supra-history" and "supra-nature" is both unintelligible and superfluous.

German Orthodoxy Is Bankrupt

By DIEDRICH MEYER-KLUEGEL

A German Free Protestant lawyer and pastor who had to flee from Nazi Germany in 1935, here gives his analysis of the attitudes and policies of the established churches of pre-war Germany, and their relationship to Germany's future.

There has been much talk about re-education of Germany, and there are various plans, some already in operation, for Christian re-education and reconstruction. However, what is needed is not the restoration of things as they were before the Nazi regime, but completely new education and new construction. For Nazism has its roots deep in Germany's past, and unless they are eradicated and something quite new and better is sown on clean ground, the same trouble will spring up all over again.

Nazism is nothing new; it is totalitarianism, and that is as old as the state itself. It is, indeed, more or less the innate tendency of every state. The totalitarian state is what the prophets of Israel were fighting against — the totalitarian state sanctioned and supported by the institutional church. And Jesus himself went to the cross because he had come into conflict with Jewish nationalism, and with the church parties which either for their wealth's sake sympathized with the Roman Empire or, for patriotic reasons, longed for a Jewish national victory. Almost all the states of ancient times were totalitarian; the state was the highest good, its sovereignty was omnipotent and all-embracing, unlimited and illimitable; it claimed the whole life of all its subjects, the inward as well as the outward life. To live for the state and to die for it was the sum of all virtues, and all ancient pagan religions culminated in the last issue in idolizing and worshipping the state and its power. The mediaeval state was a universal state which almost coincided with the church, and it was the church that exercised or at least claimed absolute supremacy. But at the end of the Middle Ages the worldly state began again to claim its sovereignty, and the modern, national state arose. In a sense it was rediscovered like the many works of classical art and literature which were revived by the Renais-

sance, and it was welcomed with no less enthusiasm. The new and yet so old ideal of a powerful, autonomous and totalitarian state was first proclaimed by Machiavelli in his book, *The Prince*. He taught that Christianity with its praise of meekness, renunciation and suffering love had weakened men, and he contended that those who believed in moral laws should keep away from politics. Politics had nothing to do with ethics; expediency rather than right had to be followed. The criterion had to be: What profits or what harms the nation? and not: What is good or what is evil?

Luther's Violent anti-Semitism

Troeltsch in his great work *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* (abridged in English translation as *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*) pointed out that Luther seems to have drawn his doctrine of the state largely from Machiavelli. In fact, Luther's writings, through which he took sides with the German princes in the horrible massacre of the German peasants, are worse than anything Machiavelli wrote. Luther was not only a religious reformer, but first of all a German nationalist. The national idea was already foremost in his struggle against the trading in indulgences (which was the starting point of his Reformation), and it dominated more or less all his life and work. There is thus much truth in regarding Luther as the spiritual ancestor of Frederick II ("The Great") of Prussia, Bismarck and Hitler. His violent anti-Semitism has scarcely been surpassed even by the notorious Jew-baiter, Streicher, of Nuremberg. Again and again Luther made the end justify the means, not only by purposely inserting, omitting or misinterpreting words in his translation of the Bible, but even by sanctioning downright lying, provided that it was done "in a worthy cause and for the sake of the Christian Church."

Luther contended that civic life did not concern God; it was only the salvation of the individual soul that mattered; the world was and would remain the devil's. The basic principle of Luther's teaching was Rom. III, 28: "We reckon therefore that a man is justified by faith alone apart from the works of the law."

Said Luther:

Christianity is nothing but a continual exercise in feel-

ing that you have no sin, although you sin, but that your sins are thrown on Christ. He becomes the sinner in your stead. . . . Be a sinner and sin boldly! . . . Sometimes it is necessary to commit sin out of hatred and contempt for the devil.

Whatever biblical truth there may be in the principle of "justification by faith," when it is over-accentuated—as Luther did by inserting the word "alone" contrary to the original text—and made the centre of the Christian religion, it becomes a source of great danger. For the egocentric and eudaemonic attitude—"What must I do to be saved?"—is entirely different from what Jesus demands, that we follow him and to help conquer the world for God and righteousness. Its result is indifference and unconcern towards the world in all social and political problems, a complete divorce between private religion and public affairs. To Luther, moreover, the state is divinely ordained; to it he consequently demands absolute obedience in all political matters. This conception of the state as "a power ordained by God" has been the cause of a persistent conservatism among the Lutherans, of an acquiescence in existing conditions and an uncritical acceptance of any powers that be, whilst freedom is claimed only for the inner world of the soul and the spiritual sphere of the church. Luther says,

Wherever the princes take their power from, it does not concern us. It is the will of God, irrespective of whether they have stolen their power or assumed it by robbery. . . . Even if the authorities are wicked and unjust, nobody is entitled to oppose them, or to riot against them. . . . The ass must have blows, and the people must be ruled by force.

With such a principle Luther sanctioned the slaughter of more than 100,000 freedom-loving peasants whom he first had encouraged and through whose support he and his Reformation had come to power. The rising of these peasants in 1525 was the first great struggle of the German people for freedom and democracy. These peasants had heard of the new freedom, justice and peace preached by humanists like Erasmus of Rotterdam and some of the reformers (particularly the Swiss), and they wanted to put these ideas into practice. They felt that only through application to the ordinary daily life of the common man would these ideas get

a real meaning. The peasants demanded the abolition of all institutional churchianity, a return to the plain and true teaching of Jesus, subordination of all life, public as well as private life, to God's holy laws, freedom of faith and worship, abolition of serfdom and villeinage, restitution of the land to the old village communities, use of the tithe for purposes of these communities only, free hunting and fishing and impartial administration of justice. The princes, striving to become absolute monarchs, were not prepared to tolerate such things. Luther owed his life to some of them, and with their help had saved the cause of his Reformation. He was their grateful and obedient servant now. He advised them,

Come, beloved lords and nobles, strike them, transfix them, and cut their throats with might and main. Should you find death in so doing, you would fall in obedience to God and defending your like against the hordes of Satan.

Free Will: Luther Versus Erasmus

In the same year 1525, a breach came between Luther and Erasmus because Luther denied the free will of man, also a breach between Luther and Zwingli and his friends because Luther insisted that Christ is present in the bread and wine on the communion table. Thus Lutheranism in all its aspects stopped halfway between Roman Catholicism and true Protestantism, and without the virtues of either of them.

The next to be destroyed by fire and sword were the Anabaptists, not because they objected to infant baptism, but because they were Socialists and Pacifists. After that no one dared to stand up against the Lutherans and their powerful supporters, the German princes. Free Christianity never got a chance to develop in Germany; the influence of liberal and modern theologians like Harnack, Troeltsch and Lietzmann remained purely academic. Students who betrayed liberal or modern views never passed the theological examinations which were held by the consistories (i.e. the church authorities in which all the administrative, judicial and disciplinary functions of the various regional or provincial German Protestant Churches are centralized) and which all candidates for the ministry have to undergo. Pastors with such views were usually soon dismissed as "heretics,"

especially in 1892 when the great controversy about the Apostolic Creed was started by the publication of Harnack's critical treatise. Harnack was a fine scholar, but like so many German scholars, he did not have the courage to come out into open battle. Political liberalism was also nipped in the bud; it was the second great struggle of the German people for freedom and democracy, and was stamped out by the Machiavellian nihilist, Bismarck, whom the Lutherans revere as their great statesman.

Confessionals Not anti-Nazi

The Lutheran influence in Germany has proved the more disastrous because the German churches were established churches. Before the war some 63 per cent of the population was Protestant, 32 per cent Catholic, and about four per cent was non-Christian. The Independent Lutherans, Independent Reformed, Free Christians, Methodists, Baptists, Quakers, and others constituted only about one per cent. The Protestants had 28 different provincial or regional churches, only loosely united in the German Evangelical Church League. Some of these churches are Lutheran, others are Reformed. The majority (i.e. those of the pre-1866 provinces of Prussia) are United Lutheran and Reformed insofar as they are united under the same administration. Some of the Reformed are Zwinglians, others are Calvinists. The establishment of the German churches meant for the Protestant churches that at the time of the princes these princes were the Primates of their respective churches, but even the Weimar Republic controlled the churches by far-reaching rights of consent, permission, sanction, ratification and veto, because the state gives considerable subventions (as a kind of compensation for the greater part of the churches' landed property which was secularized after the Napoleonic wars) and because the state also collects the church-tax for the churches (ten per cent in addition to the income tax). Everybody in pre-war Germany was "born" into and remained a member of the established Protestant or Roman Catholic Church of his district, unless he went to a law court or a commissioner of oaths and made a formal declaration that he wanted to resign from membership. The same applied if a person

wanted to leave the established church and to join a Free Church or a Free Congregation.

As in other countries there are different schools and parties within the German Protestant Churches: Orthodox, Liberals, Modernists, Socialists, Pacifists, etc. Under the Nazis the last two were immediately banned and their leaders imprisoned, and two new parties came into existence—the “German Christians” and the “Confessional Church.” The first wanted to nazify also the doctrines and institutions of the church, while the latter wanted to adhere to the old creeds and confessions, and was made up of the old and new orthodox groups. Liberals, Modernists and those who belonged to the Socialists and Pacifists hardly supported or joined the “Confessionals.” The “Confessional Church” is therefore not a church, but only a party within the German Protestant churches, and—compared with the whole number of Christian people in Germany—a minority.

The “Confessional Church” was by no means an anti-Nazi or resistance movement; on the contrary, its members welcomed and supported the Nazi revolution wholeheartedly. They kept silent in the presence of all Nazi terror, and sanctioned and blessed the war not less than did the “neutral” Lutherans of the so-called “intact churches” under Marahrens, Wurm and Meiser, or even the “German Christians.”

Niemoller Supported Hitler

The so-called “church-struggle” was only for a “theological existence,” i.e. a kind of ecclesiastical “reservation park,” a quiet corner where confessions and rites could be practised within the Third Reich (See the *Declaration of Barmen* of 1934 and Karl Barth’s *Theological Existence Today*, wherein Barth says that his concern is only theology and nothing but theology, and that Hitler must be given a chance because he had proved to be a real leader.) In November 1933 the Protestant churches with the consent also of the “Confessionals” voluntarily offered the incorporation of all the Church Youth Guilds into the Hitler Youth Organizations, even before the Nazis had asked the churches to do so. In 1935 even Barth (then a professor at Bonn University) was prepared to take the oath of absolute loyalty and unconditional obedience to Hitler, after his “Confessional” friends

(Niemöller and others) had told him that there was no harm in doing so, as long as he made the mental reservation that loyalty to God comes first. It was not until 1939 that Barth—then professor of Basle University, in his own country, Switzerland—began to discover what Nazism really meant.

Swastikas in the Churches

A great many of the “Confessionals” were members of the Nazi party, even of the SA. There were Swastikas on and in the “Confessional” churches and in the “Confessional” meetings. Not seldom there were SA-men in uniform as chairmen of these meetings, and there was no “Confessional” meeting which did not express its absolute loyalty to Hitler through resolutions or telegrams sent to him. That is why the “Confessionals” are so very touchy with regard to de-Nazification.

In 1938 the “Confessional Church” adopted the “Aryan” clause. That is why there are “Confessional” refugee pastors in Britain. All of them are Lutherans and had to leave Germany because they or their wives were so-called “non-Aryans.” Real “Confessional” refugees do not exist. Also in the same year 1938, the “Confessional” pastors and church officials (with the exception of a very few courageous outsiders) took the oath of absolute loyalty and unconditional obedience to Hitler.

Niemöller and other nationalist churchmen had made treaties with the Nazis for mutual support, the Nazis promising increased state subventions as well as the restoration of the inspection of the schools by the churches. According to one of his admirers (Leo Stein, *I was in Hell with Niemöller*) Niemöller said, “We were all very favourably impressed by his (Hitler’s) talk and his apparent modesty, and he gave his solemn word of honour that he would do what he said.”

Quarrels began when the Nazis later broke some of their pledges. But even then the “Confessionals” continued again and again to express their absolute loyalty to Nazism as such, as in their cautiously generalized and rather late “protest” of May 1936, which is always quoted as the example of their resistance, but in which criticism of anti-Christian ideas and concentration camps is mixed with repeated expressions

of deepest reverence for the Führer Hitler, and of trust in him and his words.

The backbone of the "Confessional Church" is the German (and particularly the Prussian) officer clique. Even men like Count Schwerin von Krosigk and Schacht attended the "Confessional" services, etc. It is thus that pastors of the "Confessional Church" were among those conspirators who in July 1944 tried to murder Hitler and replace him by a military dictator—either Göring or one of the generals.

Niemöller is the prototype of a Prussian officer and of a Lutheran nationalist. "The national idea was always foremost in his upbringing, and by nature he had a leaning towards the Right. Love of his profession as an officer was a matter of course to him, and he was in his element in the war." (Niemöller, *From U-boat to Pulpit*, written as late as 1934!—London 1936—p. 9). The purpose of this book was to show the Nazis what good patriots and militarists the "Confessionals" were. Niemöller glories in his deeds as a submarine officer and commander, even in down-right war crimes like the prevention of the rescue of torpedoed sailors, which he goes so far as to call the "turning point" of his life because as he says, "it opened my eyes to the utter impossibility of a moral universe."

Niemöller's Share in the "White Terror"

Niemöller hated the German Republic and democracy. "He belonged with all his heart to the enemies of the Weimar Republic. . . . Their (i.e. the Nazis') program for a national revival was fundamentally his own, with its vehement denial of all that is meant by individualism, parliamentarism, pacifism, Marxism and Judaism." (*Niemöller and his Creed*, by one of his close friends, pastor Hildebrandt, a "non-Aryan," with a foreword by the Bishop of Chichester, London 1939).

The general strike of the German workers in 1920 which was in support of the lawfully established and constitutional democratic government, was "perfectly disgraceful" to

Niemöller, and in the "White Terror" against these workers he commanded a Free Corps Battalion. When the Reds, taken prisoner by the Free Corps, were not summarily shot at the White headquarters, "there was a tacit understanding amongst the troops that no further prisoners would be sent back" to them, and the prisoners were liquidated on the spot in one way or another. The "White Terror" was the beginning of the Brown Terror, and the workers were fighting to avert what then developed into Hitlerism. While studying theology in Münster, Niemöller was one of the organizers of the notorious Organization Escherich (*From U-Boat to Pulpit*, p. 187). This nationalist gangster and terror organization was one of the main nuclei of the SA, the SS and the Gestapo.

Niemöller became an ardent Nazi. He "welcomed January 30, 1933 (the day Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany) from the bottom of his heart as the fulfillment of cherished hopes." (*Niemöller and his Creed*, p. 33) When thousands of anti-Nazis and Jews were tortured and murdered in the concentration camps, Niemöller thanked the Führer from his pulpit: "We again feel ourselves created beings. Profession and social standing, race and nationality are today again being regarded by us as important facts" (*First Commandment*, pp. 58-59). Long after Hitler had come to power, Niemöller told his congregation (consisting mainly of members of the higher officer caste) of "the divine call in Hitler's spiritual revolution which is beginning to take place throughout the whole of our nation" (*ibid.*). He quarreled with Hitler and the Nazis only about matters of church administration, telling him: "We are not driven by care for our Church, but much more by care for the Third Reich" (*Niemöller and his Creed*, p. 36).

He was sent to prison and concentration camp because he broke the laws of the state which had forbidden the taking of unauthorized collections and the announcing from the pulpit of the names of people who had resigned from church membership. In the concentration camp he was

never treated as an anti-Nazi but, backed by the officer caste and high Nazi officials, was always in a privileged position. It is worthy to note that chief Nazis like Thyssen and Schacht were also for some time in concentration camps. Children of anti-Nazis were thrown into concentration camps like their fathers. Niemöller's sons were Nazi officers.

From the concentration camp Niemöller offered his services as a naval officer to the Nazis at the outbreak of war (see Karl Barth in *The Christian Century*, May 6, 1940). He himself admitted this fact which has constantly been denied or doubted by the "Confessional" propaganda (cf. Luther about lying). His excuses are:

If sons can die for their country, so can fathers. Germany could have my body, but not my soul. . . . A German in time of war does not ask if the war is right or wrong; he has to fight and to die with his fellow-Germans.

He admitted also that he had no political objections against Nazism, and he made it quite clear that he still believes in an authoritarian regime for Germany. Furthermore, he said that up to the time of his liberation he had not heard anything about all the Nazi terror, nor had his wife known anything about it (London, News Chronicle and other papers, June 6, 1945, and the following days; Naples interview). If he has now stopped talking about these things, it is only on advice of his friends in Great Britain and Geneva.

The Real Honor Roll of German Pastors

There were courageous pastors in Germany who fought Nazism as such: Liberals, Modernists, Free Christians like Pastor Walbaum and his friends, Socialists and Pacifists like Pastor Eckert who in 1930(!) was dismissed by the Church of Baden for "having insulted the old Imperial Army (when at the General Assembly he spoke against secret re-armament) and who spent all the years of the Nazi regime in a real concentration camp. There is also Pastor Rackwitz of Berlin (who is now being persecuted by the "Confessionals" because he demands the nationalization of the big estates of the churches). Also, a few "Confessional" outsiders courageously fought Nazism as such, e. g. those who refused to take the oath of allegiance, and Pastor Schneider of Dicken-schied who was murdered in a concentration camp because

he refused to give the Nazi salute. But these active anti-Nazi pastors and their friends were scattered over the whole of Germany, without any organization of course (except underground), and not seldom slain or tortured to death in concentration camps, unless they were lucky enough to escape out of Germany. The "Confessional Church" never became illegal, and that alone is sufficient proof that it never was an anti-Nazi movement.

The Roman Catholic Church in Germany is also an established church, but as an international church it is more independent. Her attitude toward Nazism, however, has been on the whole not very much different from that of the German Protestant Churches. In signing a Concordat with the Nazi rulers the Roman Catholic Church gave the Nazi regime powerful support. There have been some bishops, e. g. Cardinal Faulhaber, who at the beginning were fairly outspoken against Nazi philosophy, and a great number of Roman Catholic priests and monks were thrown into prisons and concentration camps, mostly for alleged sexual crimes and offenses against the foreign currency regulations; but on the other hand there were also men like Hitler's intimate friend, Abbot Schachleitner, and Bishop Berning of Osnabrück, who was a Nazi Councillor of State (Staatsrat).

Free Christians Still Being Persecuted

So far neither the Protestant Churches nor the Roman Catholic Church are really being de-Nazified. It seems that bishops, theological professors, church officials and pastors are not even "screened," and Pastor Walbaum's letters and other reports from Germany show that the old gang in the German churches is enjoying the absolute confidence of the military Government and is using this powerful position for stamping out all "heresy." Free Christians are suffering persecution worse than ever before. The "Confessionals" have set up a real dictatorship in the churches.

It is of no use merely to eradicate Hitlerism in Germany, for Hitlerism is only the final outcome of German nationalism and militarism. And as Frederick II and Bismarck were Hitler's political predecessors, so Luther laid the spiritual foundation on which Nazism could be built. Unless that is

understood, the real discussion about establishing a better and peaceful Germany has not even begun. It is therefore a serious mistake to give the power in the German Protestant Churches to the "Confessionals" who are already usurping it by downright totalitarian methods. They will only restore that type of reactionary and nationalist churchianity which was one of the bud cells of Nazism. With regard to the question whom to trust with new Christian Education and new construction, there should be most careful discrimination as to the attitude of each individual bishop, superintendent, church official, professor or pastor to Nazism as such. Efficiency is a very bad criterion; nobody was more efficient than the Nazis! As everything else should be thoroughly decentralized in Germany, so should the churches be, or else they will become the nucleus for a Fourth Reich. They should be disestablished, with all administrative, legislative, disciplinary and judicial functions left to the individual congregations. Membership should be membership of an individual congregation and a matter of application. The idea of the Volkskirche (People's Church, National Church) to which everybody belongs so long as he has not formally resigned, must be given up, because it is based on the false assertion that the Church of Christ (or the People of God) is identical with institutional and established churchianity. If disestablishment results in the German churches becoming poor, or if they cease to be powerful bodies, all the better! Jesus rejected their kind of power (Matt. IV, 8-10). If the churches are going to lose the masses of those who once were members, well, it is the little flock to whom Jesus promised the Kingdom.

But the main thing is the need for a completely new orientation among the Christian people in Germany—and not only in Germany, but in the whole world. Already a hundred years ago, Kierkegaard in Denmark demanded not less than that we get rid of 1800 years of churchianity and go back to the simple truths of Jesus's life and teaching. Father and son Blumhardt did the same in Germany. The son was later dismissed by the Church of Wurtemberg because of his revolutionary views. Dr. Gerrit Jan Heering, the learned scholar of the Dutch Remonstrants, has done it from Holland

in his work *Geloof en Openbaring*. Prof. Leonhard Ragaz (who died in 1945) has done it from Switzerland with his numerous revolutionary books on the *Kingdom of God and Following Christ* (*Das Reich und die Nachfolge*, *Die Gleichnisse Jesu*, *Die Bergpredigt Jesu*, *Die Geschichte der Sache Christi*, *Die Bibel—eine Deutung*). In the Church of England it is the Modernist Dr. Major who has pointed out the great need for *Basic Christianity* as the religion for the whole world, and what he says is what liberals and modernists and Free Christians of all denominations have always felt and been striving for and what a Unitarian Commission has set out in the book, *A Free Religious Faith*. Churchianity with all its dogmas and institutions is now absolutely bankrupt, and no propaganda and no new orthodoxy will bring it back to its feet again. We have had this churchianity for 1900 years and it has brought us exactly to where we are—into utter chaos and ruin. It is high time that we went back to Jesus himself and his gospel of freedom, righteousness, peace and love. There is no other salvation for mankind.

BOOKS

The Destiny of Civilizations

A STUDY OF HISTORY. By Arnold J. Toynbee. *Abridgement of Volumes I-VI* by D. C. Somervell. New York and London: Oxford University Press. xiii, 617 pp. \$5.00.

This study, voluminous and awe-inspiring, which has been practically inaccessible to all except a relatively small circle of students and general readers, is at last available for a wider public, and is receiving its share of enthusiastic acclaim. Moreover, there are good and sufficient reasons, for the combined labors of these two competent historians, who had not previously known each other, have brought forth one of the very great books of our present century. Even in its abridged form this volume is still amazingly comprehensive in scope; and it is charmingly written. And while it provides a full week of exciting and stimulating reading, the most important thing to be said about it is that it presents an overwhelming responsibility to every intelligent reader who brings to it a sense of his own personal and social responsibility.

Toynbee has devoted a very considerable portion of his life to a painstaking survey of the overall history and civilization of the human race; and he reminds the reader that an understanding of history requires a careful probing into pre-history. Sixteen civilizations have come and gone during the past six thousand years of recorded history. Ten others have survived, but nine of these are now in a state of disintegration. The tenth—our own Western Christian combination—still possessed of considerable creative possibilities, has itself reached a state of ill health in which heroic measures are increasingly necessary.

We are never allowed, in this survey, to forget the incredible age of primitive man as compared with the relative infancy of the twenty-six civilizations. The oldest of these, and already long extinct, came into being only six thousand years ago. But human life on earth has existed perhaps some 300,000 years or more; and six thousand years are only one-fiftieth of that stretch of time. Inasmuch therefore, as every known civilization has had to emerge from some pre-historic society, an interesting point of speculation is raised. Recent anthropological studies have brought 650 such primitive societies to light, still surviving in our modern world. How many other thousands of such tribes lived and perished during the 300,000 years of pre-historic times will never be known, but Toynbee assumes that there must have been a very great many.

These primitive societies were, on the whole, arrested societies. They developed mechanical and strategic means of survival within a favorable but limited time-span. Most of them, however, were obviously incapable of any significant development beyond mere

subsistence on a low cultural level. Eventually most of them perished as though they had never been, and it was only a relative few who were able to advance to higher forms of social organization and culture.

Without an occasional breaking-through no civilization could have been possible. To become a civilization a people had somehow to achieve a changing, dynamic mode of life. They had to face trouble, and make difficult choices, and overcome problems. They had to change their habitat and their behaviour; or they had to draw on such resources as they had at their command in order to bring about some modification of their environment. They had to achieve a written as well as a spoken language, a literature, a theory of government and, most important of all, a sufficient degree of flexibility within their social structure to allow for continuing adaptation and development.

Toynbee does not accept the Spenglerian theory that civilizations are born, that they grow to maturity and finally perish of old age, as do biological organisms. Always, he says, there are specific human factors which must be taken into account, for a civilized society is a structure of human relationships rather than a biological entity. Moreover, there is no inherently superior race which, more than any other, is qualified to build a civilization; and neither is there a particular environment which guarantees its development or its survival. If life is too hard, a great people might be crushed out of existence; if life is too easy, the same people might degenerate. There is a "golden mean," in which the geographical or historical situation presents a challenge to which people must respond. In no other way have civilizations ever been brought into being. And if this is true of a people's rise, it is no less true of their decline. Toynbee discounts the theory, often advanced, that civilizations have gone under because of violence visited upon them from the outside. Invariably, when violence from without has administered its *coup de grâce*, destruction from within had previously done its tragic work. The Assyrians are cited as the classic example of a people who, having won every war, lost their own status as a civilization through sheer military exhaustion. There is no single cause of human progress or of decline. There are historic challenges and geographical and other opportunities, both internal and external, which from time to time present themselves, and there are people—white or black or brown—who accept or ignore the challenge. Toynbee's theory of "challenge and response" is one of the thrilling themes of this book.

The Importance of Creative Leadership

There is another. Wherever, the author says, human society has advanced, it was because creative individuals or determined minorities have provided the inspiration and the leadership. Without great leadership, supplied by individuals rising from out of the people,

primitive societies remained primitive. Invariably, without such leadership, civilizations have gone down in tragedy and defeat, and there is not, says Toynbee, a single known exception in all the pages of history. A society

is a product of the relations between individuals, but the source of all action is in the individuals composing it. . . . All acts of social creation are the work either of the individual creators or, at most, of creative minorities; and at each successive advance the great majority of the members of society are left behind. (pp. 211, 214)

There is one more major theory—or technique?—of human advance which must not be omitted from this review. It is the technique as Toynbee says, of “withdrawal and return.” Jesus and Mohammed and Buddha withdrew to mountain, cave or forest in order to gather insight and courage for a more effective return to the world. Thus, too, nations and peoples have withdrawn historically and geographically, only to re-enter upon the stage of human affairs with increased power and influence. The ancient Jews, forcibly withdrawn from their native habitat, developed in Babylon their social and ethical insights which became their special gift to the world. Greece developed the spirit and culture of Hellenism in a period of comparative isolation; and the British Isles, detached from the European mainland, gave back to mankind their gifts of industrialism and democracy and a universal language. There are other instances, and Toynbee, severe critic of Soviet Russia, nevertheless speaks of her recent withdrawal into nationalism (between World Wars I and II) as the possible circumstance out of which there might come at last a better way of life for mankind at large.

Internal and External Proletarians

There are other significant and far-ranging discussions which a reviewer of so vast a study cannot very well ignore. There is an unforgettable chapter, *Schism in the Social Body*, in which the process of inner destruction within a civilization is carefully scrutinized. Every society has within itself its outcast members, its proletarian individuals and groups who are “in” it but not “of” it. For, says Toynbee, whatever the original social status of a proletarian, his true hallmark is neither poverty nor humble birth, but rather a consciousness—and the resentment that this consciousness inspires—of being disinherited from his ancestral place in society, and his eventual reaction in terms of cold-blooded savagery. Moreover, whereas Western civilization has evicted, exterminated or subdued many forms of barbarism, it has bred other and more dangerous forms as, for example, the black and brown-shirted barbarians of fascism which are at the same time a consequence and a portent of inner collapse.

Thus far, in a review which must of necessity be too short although it is already too long, we have undertaken to present a brief glimpse

into the overall concept of history and civilization which Toynbee here offers us. There is not space enough for adequate criticism or dissent. Toynbee's elaborate argument, for example, to the effect that civilizations are destroyed always from within, and never from without, would seem now to require drastic modification. In his more recent reflections he has himself suggested that atomic warfare could easily bring about precisely such destruction.

Again, it would seem—although this is not really a major point—that there is something disturbingly unphilosophical in Toynbee's insistence that the aim of philosophy in our Western civilization is essentially "a detachment from life," whereas the aim of traditional Christianity has been "a return to life." There is little point in quibbling over Toynbee's use of words in this discussion, except to observe that in his very favorable estimate of the Christian religion he seems to give insufficient emphasis to the more practical scientific and social aspects of all our earthly struggles in which we are now so critically and dangerously involved. And are not philosophy and modern science more than ever before in history concerned with these problems? And to the extent of their concern do they not share the function and the nature of this "higher religion" of which Toynbee speaks? Such reflections are implicit in everything Toynbee says rather than explicitly stated by him. A confession of his own faith in human resources to avoid the great catastrophe appears near the middle rather than at the end of the book. It is a much stronger assertion than anything either said or implied in his more recent interviews and articles.

The dead civilizations are not dead by fate, or 'in the course of nature,' and therefore our living civilization is not doomed inexorably in advance . . . Though sixteen civilizations may have perished already to our knowledge, and nine others may be now at the point of death, we—the twenty-sixth—are not compelled to submit the riddle of our fate to the blind arbitrament of statistics. The divine spark of creative power is still alive in us, and, if we have the grace to kindle it into flame, then the stars in their courses cannot defeat our efforts to attain the goal of human endeavour. (p. 254)

Edwin T. Buehrer

God and—Or?—"The Creative Event"

THE SOURCE OF HUMAN GOOD. *Henry Nelson Wieman*: The University of Chicago Press. vii, 312 pp. \$3.50.

There are three contexts from which we can approach this book. The first is that of some humanists who assume that all values are human in origin and never rise beyond what is human—that man is the highest pinnacle of the universe and that there is nothing to which man need be loyal higher than man. The second context is that of the supernaturalists—there is that beyond history and time to which man must be submissive if he would understand

time. As the arch-supernaturalist of our time, Niebuhr, has said, "Man is in the position of not being able to understand himself without a principle of comprehension which is beyond his comprehension." That is a supernaturalistic way of looking at man.

Each of these views is rejected by Wieman. He is not a humanist relegating all values—and their sources—to the sphere of what is man. One of the strongest statements that I have ever read of the need of something more absolute than man is contained on p. 113 of this book. But this absolute that Wieman encourages man to believe in is not the supernatural. It is rather the creative event, *the source of human good.*

The Source of Religious Ideas

What is the source of human good? That is the crucial question. And this question raises the fundamental religious problem that faces our age. That central problem may be stated in one question: Where does man get his notions of salvation, his saviours who appear in history, his religious answers to human problems? To that question there are two conflicting answers. There are, in the first place, those who say, with countless years of history behind them, that man's crucial answers come by revelation from a supernatural God who breaks through the veil covering man's pilgrimage and supplies the answers or sends the saviours. This is the traditional and the current, though surely not necessary, answer of most Christians today.

But in the second place there are those who say that there is no such thing as revelation, that there are no answers supplied from outside history—that all of man's genuine knowledge, his salvation, and his religious insight comes in the same way in which any other form of knowledge comes—by asking questions, postulating answers and seeking to find if they are true. Just as there are hypotheses in science and presuppositions in philosophy, so there is faith in religion. These three are not greatly different, and become obstructionist only when they are taken as final. The following sentences from this book help clarify this point:

Christian leaders are saying that the divine source transcends reason and cannot be observed. If they are right, then our fate is determined . . . Revelation transcending reason would itself not be distinguishable from its opposite . . . Religious faith so interpreted as to render it rationally incompetent must be driven out.

Of these two positions Wieman obviously follows the second. This book is a strong support of the empirical—one could say "scientific" if it did not imply a subject matter not in religion—attempt to deal with religion, as one of the areas of concern that humans must investigate as thoroughly as they would investigate the atom.

This is the pivot on which criticism of this book will rest. If one takes the traditional position that God is outside history—that there is revelation at the crucial points of religious inquiry, that in

some sense everything we confront is God's creation with God outside it—then this book will be condemned as the arch evil of religious innovations. If, however, we believe that all questions in religion are like questions in any other human realm—that one must ask questions, form tentative answers, and try to prove them true or false—then this book has a message for us. For it is this issue that divides much of the religious world today. Most of the religious world thinks that there is some kind of revelation possible—all the way from an infallible pope, to an inerrant Koran, to a Father Divine. Someone has to crack this vast, almost impenetrable, domain of the untouchable. This book is written in that direction. Wieman gives this strong word of criticism of those who take the opposite position:

Thinking to serve the eternal when, in fact, they can only serve something going on in time, they are blinded by the way of salvation laid upon them in the temporal process. Seduced by the Greek idol of eternity, they cannot find the living God in time as revealed in Christ and the Hebrew prophets. (pp. 36, 7)

For a great passage on this conflict in another form in modern history, see pages 173, 4.

Religious Values in Concrete Situations

Whether this book in all its details works out a scheme of making the method clear and applicable is another question. The attempt to root religious value in concrete situations, however, can be exceedingly helpful. It is an attempt to specify conditions of value—the emergings, integratings, expandings, deepenings—the four sub-events in the creative event, the absolute process. But in all of this Wieman, in my judgment, is dealing not so much with the source of the human good, as the way in which the source produces the good. And it is here that some of the weakest writing in the book occurs. The attempt to take the life of Jesus, for example, and run it through this process of the four sub-events, appears to be hunting for a religious buttress which his position does not need. When Wieman deals with religion in general, the method he uses has great merit, but when he attempts to revert back and show that this is the way Jesus must have dealt with his religious situation it does not stand up so well. This whole section appears very weak. The criticism is not that Jesus did not act in the way Wieman suggests, but that even if he did, he thought he was acting at the behest of God. And it seems to me also that this whole position that Wieman subscribes to can be maintained without giving it the special benediction of the Hebrew Christian tradition. As I understand it, it is a method for going beyond that tradition.

The Creative Event, which is the absolute understandable from the human side in four sub-events that man can understand and experience, is superhuman though not supernatural. This is the

source of human good and the saving power of man. What blocks the Creative Event from saving us is the "projection of human purpose as sovereign over it." For this reason one of the great problems of man is to find "a directive which will so guide our use of power that it will not destroy the good we have and cut off hope of any increase but will rather serve to order the world so that good will grow, and previously undetected values will break into consciousness" (p. 29). If you ask what this directive is, the answer is to find a way to use our power very different from the "human way of apprehending value." This is a bit confusing for, presumably, humans are going to do the approaching.

But what Wieman is getting at here is something very basic—it is two things. The first is the absolute that man confronts and does not create. This absolute is very like the God of Christianity except that it is the process and not the creator, the concrete absolute that we confront, and not an abstraction. God is more than a person for a "person is always a creature and that therefore personality cannot characterize the nature of the creator" (p. 268). The second thing is the way this absolute is apprehended. This presents a difficulty, but the over-all unifying concept is that any apprehension must be pliable and subject to change. This is different because man sees only limited values, sees these in distortion, and is resistant to further vision. But there is needed a kind of religious faith "by which one commits himself to the creative event with a final devotion." But since one uses the tools of modern investigation he knows that this final devotion is not and cannot be final. In fact, the devil is a glorious vision which refuses to hold itself subject to creativity.

Other than this it is a mystery to me how the Creative Event helps man, or what it adds to what man already has.

Here is a book, nevertheless, which deserves to be read by all thinking persons who take value theory and religious faith seriously. Its main contention as to religious method will meet serious objection, but it is undoubtedly a voice in the wilderness crying aloud in behalf of an approach which will eventually be the common faith of all men. The details of the analysis will meet varied objections depending on the philosophical theory of value subscribed to.

Ralph Norman Helverson

The Church Amidst Secular Forces

RELIGION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER. A study in the sociology of religion. By J. Milton Yinger. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. XVII, 275 pp. \$3.00.

We have here a valuable attempt to describe church history from a social and economic viewpoint, and to portray the role of church and sect in their relationship to secular forces. It is a remark-

able study in the field of sociology of religion, and of interest to scholar and layman alike. . . .

The author presents first a *Typology of Religious Groups* (ch. II) and follows this in succeeding chapters with historic illustrations: *The Reformation, Calvinism and the Rise of Capitalism, The Economic Ethics of Contemporary Churches, and The Churches and War*. Of special interest are his *Summary and Conclusion*.

Yinger calls his book a study of typical responses of religious groups to changes in their environment and, in following Max Weber, he starts with the assumption that the religious "interest" of these groups is often in conflict with other "interests." What positions do churchmen and religious groups take on the subjects, he asks, a conservative or a liberal one? Does their position have a retarding or a speeding up effect on the actual course of events? How much influence does religion exercise over the behavior of man, and how great is its power to control behavior in competition with other powers in accordance with its own standards?

Yinger describes the situation of the religious groups and individuals as a *dilemma*. If they demand too much allegiance to the religious ideal they will come in conflict with secular powers, and persecution or neglect will be the result. If they do not make demands on behavior in terms of its norms they will be without influence. The dilemma is therefore to keep in position of power without sacrifice of the goals. Unfortunately he never tells where to draw the line between the "secular" and the "religious" powers. He describes the two ideal types as follows:

The church type recognizes the strength of the secular world. It accepts the main elements in the existing balance of power in order to remain in position and to get heard. It is therefore built on compromise; it claims universality, but it has to be mobile and adaptive, or, as Troeltsch says, it dominates the world and is therefore dominated by the world. The individual who belongs to the church is born into it, and so church and society tend to be synonymous. The doctrine of the church is conservative, supporting the existing power in peace and war. It tries to organize and control the existing society for its own stated end: *individual salvation!*

The sect type stresses acceptance of literal obedience to the "Synoptic Gospel" and individual perfection and asceticism. It tends to be radical, having only a small and voluntary membership. It is therefore often hostile to the state, and in opposition to the church's ecclesiastical order. It prefers isolation to compromise; but if it is to survive it must develop again into a church. So the two types can not be held apart completely.

This characterization is certainly to a great extent a correct description of major events in modern church-history with its dis-

tinctive separation of church and state. But we should be careful not to project our modern situation back over previous history. It seems significant that Yinger's "dilemma of the church" works better for our time than for the Middle-ages and early Protestantism. In any case it could be doubted whether religion was always so nicely on the church-sect side. It would indeed be difficult to place Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah or Jesus somewhere in this typology. Yinger lets the *prophet* "challenge the social order," but he tries to keep him on the side of the church in seeing in him a "product of the best in church tradition." This is a too superficial conception of prophetism. Or, if we take the medieval *monasteries* as a type of nearly "complete withdrawal from the world," a pure sect-type, according to Yinger's typology, with all its consequences, i.e. isolation without much influence on worldly events, we will find that the historical facts are otherwise. We are aware of the far-reaching and often decisive influence of the monastic movement. Early monasticism was not only a religious but also a cultural force of great influence. One reason for this effective power was the fact that it held together as one dynamic unit the ORA and the LABORA.

Religion: A Means, Not an End

This seems to be the weakest point in Yinger's essay: he fails to see religion as a universal and dynamic force, and a value orientation towards higher goals. It is very much open to question if religious and social factors have ever, or will ever act as somehow separated forces or powers opposing each other or looking for some balance of power. If church-sect authorities or "religious" leaders attempt to make this separation for some purpose or the other, it is not by so much proved that this separation exists in reality. Religious and social change act in reality in, with, and through each other. Everything else seems as wrong as the old anthropological method of taking soul and body apart. The same individuals are the bearers of religion and social change. It may even be asked if social changes are not often brought about by religious impulses. Ideal social types of a time are often set up by religious ideologies—and vice versa!

It is the prophetic mind which is aware of these changes, and this restless reaching out to new horizons. The real prophet is the man of uniqueness and wholeness; he does not "belong" to the church-sect side, and he is not a fighter for the ecclesiastical order against the secular order. He simply does not make such distinctions. Indeed, he comes in modern times often from outside organized religion; but he stays outside "religion" only because of a theological construction of a "secular" versus a "religious world."

Yinger does give some credit to this dynamic and creative factor, this truly religious factor which is manifest even in such churches as the Catholic. He recognizes that the modernist movement, once

suppressed by the church, will one day be accepted as orthodox and—as we can learn from Rome's change of behavior towards Socialist Mexico—he seems to believe with Sidney Hook that the Catholic church may some day be "ready to baptize Marx as they baptized Aristotle." But if Yinger attempts to show with such examples that "religion" is always some generations "behind the time," then we would have to ask if it is not often just the other way round. Long ago, now, and not at all pressed by some "secular powers," we found even inside the church-type enlightened minds which saw clearly the religious power in the Socialist and Communist movement (vide Christoph Blumhardt, Herrmann Kutter, or Leonhard Ragaz). Religious men, or those living at the cultural level of the vital ideas of their time, as Ortega y Gasset describes them, are well aware of the possible coming course of such events.

Here probably lies the real dilemma of all religious groups. Religious or spiritual movements, when organized—and they will never be able to avoid being organized—have to perform a role of a *compositio oppositorum*. This ever present tension goes much deeper and can not only be understood as a dilemma in the struggle for power. It hangs together with the much more tragic dilemma of our whole existence.

Hans Casparis

Our Ignorance of Man as an Individual

THE HUMAN FRONTIER. By Roger J. Williams. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 314 pp. \$3.00.

"Human Frontier" sets up a distinctly new branch of knowledge which the author very appropriately names *Humanics*. This new correlation of scientific information, of which this book is doubtless only a beginning, represents a long step forward toward a rational approach to the solution of our modern social problems.

Philosophy is defined as the "science of sciences." It is presumed to correlate all human knowledge in the fields of mind and matter into a system designed to enable man to properly relate himself to his world. Prof. Williams, however, points to a fundamental lack in the data upon which philosophy, as we now know it, is based for adequate understanding of man himself.

Past conclusions about human beings in the mass are shown to have little validity because of our failure to consider a tremendous catalog of factors in human personality about which, hitherto, there has been little organized information. *The Human Frontier* brings out sharply the fact that whereas man has been studied minutely in every department of his being by experts particularizing in every phase of his anatomy—physiology, biochemistry and psychology—nobody, heretofore, has studied men intensively as individual entities in relation to the society of which they are a part.

Says the author, "The hypothetical concept of human nature will give way to a serious study of men's nature." This, he holds, is the only valid approach to the solving of the problems of our society. This is his basic theme. In developing this thesis, the fallacy of man-in-the-abstract, the "average man," is conclusively demonstrated. We are, each of us, as unlike as individual snowflakes. Perhaps this explains the consistent failure, down the years, of such voluntary communal experiments as Robert Owen's which were based on the assumed reactions of the mythical "average man."

The author here very definitely shows that with character traits resulting from myriad combinations of varying metabolism rates, inequalities in sight and other sense reactions, in endocrine gland functions, psychological factors, heredity, environment, etc., the "average man" is an absurdity. The author holds that we can expect a better organized world only when our rising generations are educated in these things, through every instrumentality available for developing their understanding.

This book is unquestionably one of the most important in recent years and should be a "must" for everyone interested in a better tomorrow's world.

Arthur B. Hewson.

Enjoyable and Instructive

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF NONSENSE. *By Bergen Evans.*
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 275 pp. \$3.00.

The author tells us that the seeds of this book were planted in his mind several years ago. He had picked up a hitchhiker, a talkative young man. Dr. Evans was fascinated by the extent and depth of this young man's ignorance combined with his complete self-assurance. He was so confident—even militant, in his ignorance, so utterly wrong about everything in the wide range of his talk that Dr. Evans was moved to do a little investigating among people who had enjoyed more privileges in wealth, education and culture. He found their ignorance, credulity and assurance quite equal to that of the hitchhiker.

This experience set our author to further inquiry into the wide field of the nonsense that lies lodged in modern minds, undisturbed by all the general education and intelligence that surrounds them. The book is a catalog of an astonishing lot of folklore, superstitions, unchallenged and unquestioned beliefs, nonsense of all kinds firmly believed by our friends and neighbors. Refuting them one by one he quotes authorities accepted by scientists.

As one example of nonsense offered by responsible and supposedly reliable sources Evans cites stories published in January 1940 by The New York Times, Chicago Daily News, Reader's Digest, Fortune Magazine and others, of whole battalions of

Russian soldiers frozen in grotesque postures in the terrible cold of the Finnish forests. Some were said to have stiffened in the very act of throwing a bomb. Such tales were fed to the American public for weeks without effective protests by the readers. Apparently they were swallowed without difficulty.

Everyone "knows" Negroes are carefree and happy—also libidinous and dangerous. They are easily frightened, have small brains encased in very hard skulls, the sutures of which close prematurely, checking any further growth. Senator Bilbo, a doctor author of a recent medical book and another doctor writing in American Journal of Anatomy, are three authorities who so declare, which proves something or other.

We all "know", too, that women are inferior intellectually to men, but have the compensating advantage of intuition. Dr. Evans has a lot of fun with this popular notion. He offers ironical reproof to modern women for being so unlike Ben Bolt's "Sweet Alice" who wept with delight at a smile from her master and trembled in fear at his frown. Tennyson, in *In Memoriam* pictures the ideal woman who "knows but matters of the house" while her masterful husband "knows a thousand things."

Readers of this book are likely to find many of their own cherished beliefs targets for Dr. Evans' pungent comment. The savagery of savages, like the piggishness of pigs, are facts only for those who take words for facts. Brutality to women is not "caveman stuff" to scientists, who know it as a practice much more common in civilized than in primitive society. "You can't change human nature", a truism endorsed by Dr. Robert M. Hutchins writing in Fortune Magazine, is another popular belief which our author impales on his pen.

One important category of arrant nonsense accepted as truth, and defended by educated and supposedly intelligent people of our day, is that of the myths that smother religion. They are a bit outside the field selected by the author, but it is a pity he had to omit them. He has done a great service by thus exposing as nonsense a great array of popular ideas. Needless to say, the book is as enjoyable as it is instructive.

Charles H. Coyle

A Major Contribution

PEACE OF MIND. By Joshua Loth Liebman. New York: Simon and Schuster. 203 pp. \$2.50.

Liebman has performed a much needed task for liberal religion. Retaining the spirit of profound conviction himself, he has indicated clearly religion's assets as well as its liabilities. Moreover, drawing upon a long experience in helping people, he has shown the relationship between fundamental contributions from the fields

of psychiatry, and depth psychology, to the work of the church. It is in this very field that the liberal church generally has been weakest, and in which it has lagged behind other groups in modifying its techniques and its approach to human problems.

Liebman introduces the reader to the whole field of psychology and its relationship to religion in his first chapter, in which he compares the two disciplines. He draws parallels between religion's emphasis on the unity of man within himself and the attempt of psychiatry to achieve the same goal. He recognizes that "only in the mighty confluence of these two tides (psychiatry and religion) shall we find peace of mind." It is the supplementary relationship of both elements that has needed emphasis for a long time.

Liebman also analyzes the psychological basis of the confessional, and points to its short-comings. His chapter on conscience, in which he sounds a note long silent, is perhaps the best in the entire book. In this, the author re-affirms the validity of human conscience together with its reliability. In these days of man's pessimistic attitude toward himself, it is well to hear this note again, struck in full confidence of a man who has command of two closely-related fields concerned with the human spirit.

A second note that has needed re-emphasis has been that of man's obligation to himself. Discussing the various forms of self-degradation, such as alcoholism and other forms of masochistic lack of self-regard, Liebman urges the old Rankian claims for sufficient acceptance of oneself as being the first step toward a re-integrated personality. In another chapter he draws the line between neurotic fears and genuine fears, and unmasks some of fear's representatives for us. It is his section on *Grief's Slow Wisdom*, however, that is of special importance for the liberal clergyman. Liebman points to the fact that repressed grief is not infrequently the genesis of subsequent difficulties. He urges the individual to express his grief as he actually feels it, and to seek a forward looking attitude—the opening of a new chapter in one's life, as it were. We suspect that many funeral services would be infinitely improved if ministers would take Liebman's sixth chapter to heart.

The book concludes with two additional chapters on religious belief, analyzing the types of unbelief prevalent today, and suggesting possible psychological origins for much avowed atheism. The last chapter recapitulates the first, indicating where religion and psychology part and meet, and how the two fields of human knowledge interpenetrate and fuse into a dynamic whole.

Peace of Mind must not, however, be taken as the final answer. Much of it needs re-evaluation for the liberal, be he humanistic or theistic. It is not a text-book on psychiatry for liberal clergymen, for Liebman, studiously we suspect, avoids all discussion

of techniques and principles of therapy. Our one criticism of the book lies in this area. The position of the rabbi among the Jews is not parallel to that of the liberal clergyman among his people. The latter is often severely limited in the things he can do and say and in the extent to which he may carry a counseling program, even when adequately trained in this work. The danger of this book is that it shall be used as a text-book, and that men shall consider themselves adequately prepared by a perusal of it. Only too often in the liberal church the clergyman is not in a position to be accepted in the role of a counselor on these intimate problems which the author has been privileged to handle.

The chief value of *Peace of Mind* is for lay consumption. The layman must be helped in his re-evaluation of the role of both his clergyman and his church, and Liebman has taken a great stride in the right direction. Whether we like it or not, even whether we as laymen or clergyman approve, the liberal church is going to be called upon for the kind of counseling Liebman describes; and if *Peace of Mind* has done no more than awaken us clergymen to our duty, it shall have made a major contribution to the church of our generation. It is truly one of the signs of the times that had better be heeded.

Edwin C. Broome, Jr.

The Lady with the Lamp

FIERY ANGEL—FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE. By Ramona Sawyer Barth. Coral Gables, Florida: Glade House. 94 pp. \$1.00.

Here is a biography—enlightening, inspiring and challenging to all women.

The following is a quotation from the preface by Carrie Chapman Catt, the founder of the League of Women Voters of the United States.

I would like to have everyone read this story of Florence Nightingale. I am sure that the conditions in Crimea duplicated those of every large and bloody war until the coming of Florence Nightingale. In 1860 the first school of scientific nursing was established as the result of her agitation. Now every army has nurses to care for the sick and wounded. Those who read Fiery Angel will certainly agree that Florence Nightingale was one of the greatest of the great.

In 1854 all England was stirred by the reported treatment and neglect of the wounded and sick soldiers fighting in the Crimean War. An aroused public demanded an investigation or that the situation be corrected.

Sidney Herbert, Secretary of War, knew that Florence Nightingale was an experienced administrator of a London Hospital and plagued with an inner sense of duty toward her fellow men; so the announcement came from the War Office that Miss Nightingale had been appointed by the government to the office of Superin-

tendent of Nurses at Scutari. In the opinion of the Secretary she was the "one woman in England who was fitted by position, knowledge and training to organize a nursing staff and take them out to the aid of the suffering soldiers." This recognition marks one of the milestones in the feminist movement.

Mrs. Barth gives us a picture of a Florence Nightingale quite different from those of Longfellow and other sentimental writers of that era. Her Nightingale is a young, handsome woman, intelligent, with a quick temper, a dominating personality, super-human energy and a wilful determination to put a plan into action.

Within six months after going out to Crimea in the fall of 1854, she had reduced the death rate in the hospital at Scutari from 60 per cent to 1 per cent. She fed the starving, clothed the naked and restored the morale of the discouraged men.

At the height of this great work, Florence Nightingale was bitterly attacked and persecuted at home for having dared to "circumvent military authority" and cut red tape, for being a "female" and "one of England's detested non-conformists—a Unitarian."

Man's inhumanity to man continues. Modern women need this image before them.

"Florence Nightingale was no plastic saint. 'A Lady with a Lamp,' she was of course, but behind that lamp was also a Lady with a Will."

Frances Weedman Miles

The Twilight of Laissez Faire

THE SOVIET IMPACT ON THE WESTERN WORLD. By Edward Hallett Carr, New York: The Macmillan Company. 113 pp. \$1.75.

Beginning with the *Political Impact*, the author presents a treatise on democracy, in which he defines and analyzes the Soviet concept in contrast with our own. Many surprises are in store for the reader who has always assumed because of historical priority, that our "democratic way of life" should be our own private monopoly. It is emphasized, that in order to understand Soviet democracy, it must be placed in the setting of the French Revolutionary tradition. According to the Soviets, the downfall of feudalism came about through the combined efforts of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but the former betrayed the democratic tradition by turning against the latter, thus preventing its completion. The Soviets believe they fulfilled this tradition in Russia when, in 1917, they overthrew their semi-feudal despotism and completed the revolution by seizing power from the bourgeoisie. According to Prof. Carr, "The challenge which Soviet democracy presents to the Western world is a challenge to complete the unfinished revolution."

The *Economic Impact* is synthesized in the broad word, "planning." In a national sense, planning signifies efficiency in production; whereas, *socially*, it stands for justice through a more equit-

able distribution of the goods produced. The author credits capitalism with the introduction of planning on a national scale; but he also points out that Soviet socialism has contributed most to its development by combining both the national and social objectives into an effective unified policy.

In considering the *Social Impact*, Prof. Carr reminds the West of its retreat from the ideology of laissez-faire, that material faith which emphasizes individual enterprise as producing the best social results. Along with the pressure of industrial conditions, the social philosophy of planning, by combining both the material and moral appeal with recognition of equal social obligations and equal rights, is rapidly changing the direction of our thinking toward the possibilities of a more cooperative society. The Soviets believe that equality of opportunity places individualism on a higher moral plane, where every citizen may compete for rewards, not by exploiting his fellow-men, but by rendering conspicuous service to the welfare of society. Is it any wonder that "rugged individualism" is losing its glamour and relevance in the contemporary world?

In the chapter on *International Relations*, much emphasis is placed on the Soviet foreign trade monopoly in which all the foreign trade of the Soviet Union is conducted through a central agency. Other countries have recognized the virtues of such a united front, and have sought through indirect methods to reap some of its advantages. But in spite of its success as a stabilizing factor, the Soviet Union failed to insulate itself against the far-reaching effects of world depression.

The *Ideological Impact* is concerned with the changing concepts of man's relationship with man. Here all the faiths are brought into play and weighed one against the other. "To improve the material standards of living of the masses," says Prof. Carr, "is today a mission commanding the same kind of moral fervour as formerly went into the task of winning their souls." The moral impact of this approach has moved a few modern churchmen to argue that, "the cure of men's souls cannot be successfully undertaken in isolation from the cure of their bodies." Few serious readers will miss the thought that if official religion were free from all political and economic restraints, how naturally two opposing worlds would become one.

Without substantial change, the six chapters of this slender volume are offered to the reader as they were originally delivered as lectures at Oxford, early in 1946, all of which portend a later and more extensive study. However, the present work is a valuable contribution to international understanding, and while it was evidently produced for European consumption, Americans should find it equally pertinent and rewarding.

Edward Drew Gourley

Index to Volume Eight

EDITORIALS

Christian Faith and Unity.....	129
Devotional Utterances Addressed to the Audience.....	167
Human Freedom and the Liberal Faith.....	185
The Greater Tradition.....	1
The Religion Men do not Recognize.....	65

ARTICLES

Brief Reflections on Protestant Unity [A Letter] By J. E. Ledden.....	165
Can Schweitzer Save us From Niebuhr? By Robert L. Cope.....	156
German Orthodoxy is Bankrupt By Diedrich Meyer-Kluegel.....	216
Humanistic Theism By Gardner Williams.....	132
Lucy Stone—Crusader for Human Rights By Ramona Sawyer Barth.....	15
Reintegration of Religion and Culture By R. H. Amphlett Micklewright.....	6
Religious Education on School Time [Concluding installment] By Gerald F. Weary.....	26
Religious Pessimism and Faith in Europe [A Letter] International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom.....	163
Religious Toleration in the Colony of Maryland By Richard B. Carleton.....	141
Social Background of English Unitarianism By F. H. Amphlett Micklewright.....	199
"Status" as a Political and Religious Motive By Sebastian De Grazia.....	91
The Intellectuals Run Out By Harry C. Steinmetz.....	81
The Minister as Counselor, I By Edwin C. Broome, Jr.....	70
The Promise and Destiny of the Americas By John H. Hershey.....	102
The Soul of the Woman's Movement By Ramona Sawyer Barth.....	145
Tragic and Sublime Aspects of Christian Love By Charles Hartshorne.....	36
When Protestants do Not Protest By Harmon M. Gehr.....	190

BOOK REVIEWS

Adamic, Louis— <i>Dinner at the White House</i> By Edward Drew Gourley.....	122
Barth, Ramona Sawyer— <i>Fiery Angel: Florence Nightingale</i> By Frances W. Miles.....	242
Benet, William Rose, and Norman Cousins [Editors] — <i>The Poetry of Freedom</i> By Bernardine A. Buehrer.....	173

Bradley, Dwight J.— <i>Your Problem, Can it be Solved?</i>	59
By Isabel A. Gehr.....	
Brown, William Adams— <i>What Think Ye of Christ?</i>	63
Brown, William Adams— <i>Towards a United Church</i>	182
Carr, Edward Hallett— <i>The Soviet Impact on the Western World</i>	243
By Edward Drew Gourley.....	
Chase, Stuart— <i>Democracy Under Pressure</i>	63
Cohen, Morris R.— <i>The Faith of a Liberal</i>	55
By Harmon M. Gehr.....	
Cripps, Sir Stafford— <i>Towards Christian Democracy</i>	175
By Felix D. Lion.....	
Dewey, John— <i>The Problems of Men</i>	124
By Edwin T. Buehrer.....	
Evans, Bergen— <i>The Natural History of Nonsense</i>	239
By Charles H. Coyle.....	
Eberhart, Richard, and Selden Rodman [Editors]— <i>War and the Poet</i>	121
By Jacob Trapp.....	
Feibelman, James— <i>The Theory of Culture</i>	176
By Harmon M. Gehr.....	
Flamm, Irving H.— <i>An Economic Program for a Living Democracy</i>	126
By Charles H. Coyle.....	
Frank, Erich— <i>Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth</i>	211
By Alfred Stiernotte.....	
Gossip, John Arthur— <i>Experience Worketh Hope</i>	62
Huberman, Leo— <i>The Truth About Unions</i>	60
By Homer A. Jack.....	
Johnson, F. Ernest [Editor]— <i>World Order: Its Intellectual and Cultural Foundations</i>	57
By Gerald F. Weary.....	
Labor Research Association [Sponsors]— <i>Labor Fact Book No. 7</i>	181
Lasch, Robert— <i>Breaking the Building Blockade</i>	54
By Jack Mendelsohn, Jr.....	
Liebman, Joshua Loth— <i>Peace of Mind</i>	240
By Edwin C. Broome, Jr.....	
MacIver, R. M. [Editor]— <i>Civilization and Group Relationships</i>	52
By Ray Lussenhop.....	
Mumford, Lewis— <i>Values for Survival</i>	121
By Randall S. Hilton.....	
Myrdal, Gunnar— <i>An American Dilemma</i>	178
By Edwin T. Buehrer.....	
Nikhilananda, Swami— <i>Essence of Hinduism, and Self-Knowledge</i>	183
Northrop, F.S.C.— <i>The Meeting of East and West</i>	171
By Kenneth L. Patton.....	
Patton, Kenneth L.— <i>Beyond Doubt</i>	180
By Karl M. Chworowsky.....	
Reese, Curtis W. Reese— <i>The Meaning of Humanism</i>	116
Round Table, by Edwin H. Wilson, Rowland Gray-Smith, Edward W. Ohrenstein, Leslie T. Pennington, Thaddeus B. Clark and Curtis W. Reese	
Runes, Dagobert D. [Editor]— <i>Bible for the Liberal</i>	183
Russell, Bertrand— <i>A History of Western Philosophy</i>	49
By Edwin T. Buehrer.....	
Santayana, George— <i>The Idea of Christ in the Gospels</i>	123
By Dale Dewitt.....	
Schoen, Max— <i>Thinking About Religion</i>	61
By Gardner Williams.....	

Shapiro, Harry Herschel, and Mildred Whitney Stillman [Editors] — <i>Bring Hither the Timbrel</i>	182
Shipley, Joseph T. [Editor]— <i>Dictionary of Word Origins</i>	182
Stein, Gunther— <i>The Challenge of Red China</i>	
By Harold P. Marley.....	56
Toynbee, Arnold J.— <i>A Study of History</i>	
By Edwin T. Buehrer.....	229
Van Dusen, Henry P.— <i>They Found the Church There</i>	62
Wieman, Henry Nelson— <i>The Source of Human Good</i>	
By Ralph Helverson.....	232
Williams, Roger J.— <i>The Human Frontier</i>	
By Arthur B. Hewson.....	238
Yinger, J. Milton— <i>Religion in the Struggle for Power</i>	
By Hans Casparis.....	235

RESPONSIVE READINGS

I Hear America Singing—Arranged from <i>Walt Whitman</i>	46
The Blessed Communion of Human Lives—Arranged from <i>W. Rupert Holloway</i>	47
The Free Mind—Arranged from <i>William Ellery Channing</i>	45
True Democracy—Arranged from <i>Thomas G. Massaryk</i>	48

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE MATERIALS

A Congregational Expression of Self-Dedication—Arranged by <i>Vincent B. Silliman</i>	115
Antiphonal Invocations—Arranged by <i>Vincent B. Silliman</i>	112
Calls to Worship—Arranged by <i>Vincent B. Silliman</i>	114
Service for the Reception and Naming of an Infant— <i>Jacob Trapp</i>	169

Introducing Our Contributors

Harmon M. Gehr, our associate editor, contributes to this issue a challenging discussion of that perennial problem of the separation of church and state. . . . **F. H. Amphlett Micklewright** who, in our summer issue, 1945, contributed a survey of Contemporary English Unitarianism, now gives us the social history behind the present situation. . . . **Alfred Stiernotte**, associate minister of the First Unitarian Society in Salt Lake City, is also associate editor of the Humanist. . . . **Diedrich Meyer Kluegel** was a lawyer in Germany, serving the Central Church Administration until 1935. His outspoken resistance to Nazism made it necessary for him to flee to England. He has addressed many audiences and has contributed frequent magazine articles on Free Christianity and its Social and Political Implications on the European Continent. . . . **Ralph Norman Helverson** is the minister of the First Unitarian Society in Ithaca, New York. . . . **Hans Casparis** is a native of Switzerland, and a professor of theology and church history at Canton College, Chur. He has just completed a year of scholarship study at the Meadville Theological School and the University of Chicago. He has written for the American Journal of Sociology. . . . **Arthur B. Hewson** is a business man in Chicago, and an active Unitarian layman. . . . **Charles H. Coyle** is a business man in Cicero, Illinois. . . . **Edwin C. Broome, Jr.**, whose recent article in the winter issue, 1947, on ministerial counseling attracted wide attention, here gives us his views on PEACE OF MIND. Dr. Broome received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. . . . **Frances W. Miles** (Mrs. Pierre L.), a former teacher and business woman, lives in Chicago. . . . **Edward Drew Gourley** is an artist and a writer who lives at Glenview, Illinois.

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ANNOUNCES

FOR THE FALL AND WINTER ISSUES

THE PROTESTANT ETHOS OF WORK

By Klara Vontobel

Dr. Vontobel, who recently received her Ph.D. from the University of Zürich, has spent a year of study in America. Her book, *The Ethos of Work in German Protestantism*, has become a landmark in the study of man's attitude towards his daily task.

GEORGE SANTAYANA AND LIBERAL RELIGION

By Gardner Williams

Here is a careful appraisal of the contributions of this enigmatic philosopher to religious thinking.

THE MINISTER AS COUNSELOR, II

By Edwin C. Broome, Jr.

Dr. Broome considers some of the more practical problems and pitfalls of ministerial counseling, as a follow-up of his discussion in the winter issue.

REALITY AND HUMAN CONDUCT

By Wendell Thomas

A consideration of the world-views of Aristotle, Newton and Einstein, as a background for a more comprehensive scientific approach to the problem of human behaviour.

MAN AND HIS UNIVERSE

By Kenneth L. Patton

The author, completely accepting the naturalistic approach in his consideration of the universe and man's place in it, here suggests the "magnificence" of such spiritual adventuring.

Service materials edited by Vincent B. Silliman, and books indispensable to every minister and teacher, competently reviewed by their own colleagues in religious liberalism.

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